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/

To:
From:

Justice Powell
Bob

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM

I~

Tl-..ut_ r•~

No. 85-608, Illinois v. Krull ~
No. 85-759, Maryland v. Garrison
No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks
Each

of

these

three

cases

lv~~

~ ~JA.(~)

presents questions

about

the

application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
announced

in United States v.

Leon,

u.s.

468

897

(1984).

This

supplemental memorandum is an attempt to set out a unified approach to these questions.
You will recall that Illinois v.
cer' s

good

faith

reliance on a

administrative searches.
constitutional.

searched
Hicks,

the

a

statute authorizing warrantless

The statute subsequently was held un-

Maryland v.

officers obtained

Garrison is the case in which the

valid warrant

apartment

Krull involves an offi-

next

to search an apartment,

door

by

mistake.

In

Arizona

but
v.

the officers entered the apartment under exigent circum-

stances and

then moved stereo components

in order

to read the

serial numbers and determine whether the equipment was stolen.
As
when,

-

not

I

read

Leon,

and only when,
deter

the

good

faith

exception

should

apply

application of the exclusionary rule ---.
would

law enforcement officers

from the

illegal search or

seizure at issue.

This focus on deterrence

is consistent with

your opinion in Stone v. Powell. ~
I

now consider,

briefly,

four

possible

applications of

Leon to these cases in light of the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.
1.

Leon applies only when the officers reasonably rely

on a warrant, and the warrant authorizes their action.
seems to me, is the narrowest plausible reading of Leon.

This, it
It has

the advantage of establishing a bright-line rule, but at the cost
of

excluding

Hicks.

evidence

in

cases

such

as

Krull,

Garrison,

and

It seems to me that the exception can be extended to per-

mit the jury to consider the evidence in at least some of these
cases without any appreciable reduction in the deterrent effect
of the exclusionary rule.
2.
on a warrant,

Leon applies only when the officers reasonably rely
even if the warrant does not authorize their ac-

tion.

This approach would expand the exception to include Garri-

son.

Of course, the magistrate did not authorize the search the

officers actually made, and the officers lacked probable cause to
conduct that search.

Still, it is clear that the officers would

not have acted any differently had they known the evidence would
be excluded.

If the focus is on deterrence,

it seems pointless

to exclude probative evidence because of this mistake.
3.

Leon applies only when the officers reasonably rely

on a warrant or on a statute authorizing warrantless searches.
If the officer is entitled to rely on the magistrate,

I see no

reason why he should not be entitled to rely on the legislature,

so long as the statute does not clearly violate the Fourth Amendment.

There is no reason to think that legislatures are inclined

to pass statutes that exceed the bounds of the Fourth Amendment.
This approach would extend the exception to include Illinois v.
Krull.
4.
objectively

Leon

applies

reasonable.

whenever

This

the

seems

to

officer's
me

to

be

behavior
the

is

broadest

reading of Leon that is consistent with a focus on deterrence of
police misconduct.

As

a

practical matter,

this approach would

extend the exception to cases in which the officer relies on a

- - - ------ ---- - - --- ----···---- -

----

judicial decision that subsequently

------treme, conducts
tutional

in

-·~

is reversed or,

at the ex-

a warrantless search that is likely to be consti-

light of

prior

judicial decisions.

This

approach

might allow the evidence obtained in Hicks to be admitted even if
the officer's action is held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.

Although this approach may be sound in theory, I am uncom-

fortable with its practical effect.

First, it is unrealistic to

------------------------·~-----to acquire a detailed knowledge of the

expect police officers
vast

body of

Fourth Amendment decisions.

this approach may be . quite open-ended.
decisions
trained

often

turn

on

their

officer

must

often

be

doubt

search or seizure requires a warrant.

I

am afraid

Because Fourth Amendment

particular
in

Second,

facts,
whether

even
a

a well-

particular

If the officer knows that

the evidence will be excluded if his action is held unconstitutional, the officer is more likely to go to a magistrate.

If the

officer knows that the evidence will be admitted if his action

1:"'-J-

••

was "reasonable" at the time, the officer is more likely to proceed without a warrant.
I therefore recommend that you apply Leon only when the
officer acts pursuant

t~~ ~ statu0 that the officer

reasonably believes authorizes the search or seizure.

Ron-

ald has authroized me to say that he joins in this recommendation.

~1.··~ 11/1~· J~~~,_d~~lJ-;-j
ral 11/13/86

~~~ ~ ~~- ~y-<ctd._~ f1 ~J:rtctu ~

M-~.

~/3d-~~~~~
~~~,,~H~-i!

~ ~~?:_~...-6~

'75 ~ ~ ~ I.L.t-

BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:

Justice Powell

From:

Bob

November 13, 1986

._,.. \t

No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks
Cert. to Ariz. Ct. App.

(Hathaway, PJ, Livermore, Lacaginina)

Monday, December 8, 1986 (4th case)

SP:~ ,,Jfr

tpJ

~ ~~ -::;;"' g
Questions Presented
~
~ 1. May police officers who lawfully enter a dwelling,
. ~~.. r~
(' Jfl': ,. tV
k who reasonably suspect that personal property in plain view
have

been

stolen,

handle

identification numbers?

the

property

in

order

to

and
may

record

2.

2.

Does

the

good

faith

exception of

Leon

apply

when

officers conduct a search without probable cause, and then obtain
information obtained during the
-----~·----

illegal search?

I•

------....

BACKGROUND
Officers entered resp's apartment without a warrant after

a bullet fired through the floor of the apartment struck a man in
the

apartment

below.

Resp

concedes

circumstances justified the entry.

that

the

exigent

Upon entering the apartment,

the officers saw a .25 caliber automatic pistol in plain view on r.k4~ ~
the living room floor.

A

s~f

the apartment turned up a

stocking mask, a sawed-off .22 caliber rifle, and a banana clip.
The officers observed ex_:eensi_ye stereo
room and

bedroom.

Because

the

in the living

eguip~ent

apartment

was

in

a

"low-rent

area," and was "littered with drug paraphernalia and alcoholic
beverage

containers,"

one

of

the officers

stereo equipment had been stolen.

-

suspected

that

the

-

The discovery of a stocking

mask and guns of a type likely to be used in robberies, and the
fact

that

Officer

Nelson

recognized

the

name

of one of

the

tenants of the apartment from prior police work, all contributed
to his suspicion.
view,

Although the stereo components were in plain

Officer Nelson had to move to components to record the

..__..,;

serial

numbers

--

(which

were

located

either

on

the

back

or

-=-

components).
Officer Nelson telephoned the
-- - - r
Identification Bureau from the apartment and learned that the

underneath

the

turntable was stolen property.

On the basis of this information,

~
~

3.

another

officer

components.
have

obtained

Some of

been

a

search

the other components
Resp was

stolen.

warrant

charged with

and

seized

the

later were found

to

kidnapping and armed

robbery in connection with the theft of the stereo components.
Resp
apartment.
by

moved

to

suppress

all

the

items

seized

from

his

The State argued that the initial entry was justified

exigent

circumstances,

and

that

seizure

of

the

stereo

components was justified by the plain view doctrine of Coolidge

v.

New

Hampshire,

u.s.

403

443

(1971).

motion, and the Ariz. Ct. App. affirmed.
'-------......

The

tc

granted

The Ct. App. held

the

trC

tha~~Jl

recording the serial numbers was an additional search unrelated
to the exigent circumstances justifying the entry and outside the
scope of the plain view doctrine.

The Ariz. Sup. Ct. declined to

review the judgment.

II.

DISCUSS ION
The

action

unreasonable

to

of

me.

opinions in the area,
the

stereo

"search";

and

the
After

studying

however,

components
(2)

police

to

officers
this

does

not

seem

and

your

prior

case

I have concluded that

obtain

the warrantless

the

serial

(1) moving

numbers

search was not

was

a

justified by

~

exigent circumstances.

I am inclined to think that the officers'

action is

the plain view doctrine,

justified by

although I

~d...,_.,
I'U-4~{

am "Bu./- crt(

u.-ceh.,.....

troubled by the State's unnecessary concession that the

officers ~

lacked probable cause to believe that the stereo components were ~
stolen.

·'.

't

~~

~-u:> 4.

11~~~
.h:J ~

~ vrr~w~a~s~t~h~e~r~e~=a~s~e~a~r~c~h~?_The

1.

on

whether

resp

had

a

answer to this question turns

"constitutionally

expectation of privacy."

urges

the

Court

reasonable

California v. V(; iraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809,

1811 (1986); United States v. Jacobsen, 466
Petr

protected

to

hold

that

u.s.

there

109, 113 (1984).

is

no

reasonable

expectation of privacy in the serial numbers on objects in plain
view,

even

view.

if

the

serial

themselves

are

not

in

plain

Petr argues that "[t]he right of privacy should attach to

the object,
however,

not

the

I

police

Petr

br f.

11.

(Petr

concedes,

to obtain identification numbers.)

think resp had a

numbers

serial

number."

that the officers would not have been permitted to take

the ~ rt

not

officers

apartment,
officers

are

surely
will

are

in

reasonable expectation of privacy in

in plain

the

not

plain

view.

resident

the

view.

about

Here

P resent

lawfully

move

numbers merely because
etc.

numbers

my

reasoning:

in

a

"middle

reasonably
the

the

expects

apartment

television,
If

is

stereo,

police may

If

checking

serial

do so in a "low rent" apartment merely because it is low rent.

~

' Persons living close to, or even below, the poverty line may, and
choose to buy one or two expensive items.

(According

to the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 98 percent of
American households had television sets in 1985, and 92 percent
had color sets. )

~

~ ~~

~

microwave oven, ~f ~
)'J4A.....v-serial
~
not check

~

often do,

~

class" ~~
~~
that the vf. ~Cot(

numbers in a "middle class" apartment, then surely they may not

- 1

!}8{;.._

To subject a poor person's property to close

inspection merely because the person is poor is antithetical to
our shared belief that people are entitled to dispose of their

5.

income,

however

limited,

as

they

see

Such

fit.

a

search

therefore seems to violate reasonable expectations of privacy.
"[P] rivacy
residence."
On

J.).

Class,
are

its

facts,
Ct.

entitled

to

(VINs)

pervasive

u.s.

Michigan v. Clifford, 464

106 S.

Numbers

interests are especially strong

this

960

case

(1986),

read

and

is

287, 296-297 (POWELL,

different

from New York

record

the

Class,

regulation

of

Vehicle

Identification

moreover,

relies on the

automobiles,

including

requirement that the VIN be placed in plain view.
such

requirement

for

v.

which holds that police officers

of automobiles.

government

in a private

stereo

components

the

There is no

or

other

household

no

constitutionally ~~

appliances.

Petr

briefly

argues

thai" resp

had

protected privacy interest because the property turned out to be
Petr

stolen.

brf.

at

11,

n.

This

1.

proposition

is

flatly

inconsistent with the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.
If

it

were

accepted,

police

officers

could

search

subject only to the threat of civil liability.

at

will,

If the officer

found any contraband, the exclusionary rule would not apply.
2.

Was there a seizure?

I am inclined to think there was

~
c:(..

also a

seizure,

although

I

think

it is a close question.

The ~,<

outcome turns on whether there was a meaningful interference with
resp's possessory interest in property.

s.

Ct.

around,

2778,
or

seizure.
"possession"

2782

picking
No
of

doubt
the

(1985).

Resp

up,

stereo

the

the

argues

officer

components

Maryland v. Macon,

while

that

merely

105

turning ~
~1---<..tc...a..,

components ,constituted
took

momentary

handling

them.

a ~~

physical
In

this

6.

sense, there was a brief seizure.
however,

that

it may

not

have

The interference was so brief,
been

"meaningful."

Resp

also

argues that writing down the serial numbers was a "seizure."

I

fail to see how resp was deprived of any possessory interest in
the serial numbers.
be sure,

He lost "exclusive possession" of them, to

but that loss seems, at most, an interference with a

reasonable expectation of privacy--i.e.,
few courts

have

held

that

taking

a search.

notes

during

a

Although a
search may

.

?t.ol

constitute a seizure, such holdings might lead to the odd result
that no seizure would have occurred if the officer had simply
remembered the numbers without writing them down.
3.
reasonable?

If

the

officer's

action

was

a

search,

was

it

Exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few in

number and carefully delineated."
District Court, 407

u.s.

United States v. United States

297, 318 (1972}.

Z/)

Resp concedes that
11

the ~

/ -~
who ~ CJI{

exigent circumstances justified the officers initial entry' into

..;;..,::_:;;_;:~-=-s_e__.arch
fired the gun,

serial

the person

for additional victims, and for weapons.

seems to be general agreement, however,
stereo

for

-

numbers

was

not

There

that inspection of the

justified

by

the

exigent

-l. j~~
~

~

~
J9a..l-

~;:::;_~

circumstances.

~s~t-

Petr is on stronger ground in arguing that the officer's
action is justified by the
Hampshire.

~ vie~

The police clearly met two of the three

in ~~olid92(: ;~hey

set out in the plurality opinion

justification for intrusion, and
themselves

of Coolidge v.

was

inadvertent.

~

N~ ~~~~

requiremen~~
had a

prior ~

~ iscovery of the components ~--

the ~

The

question

is

whether

it

was

~

~

~~-e ~~

~~
"immediately apparen '
quite

surprised

by

~ ··~

~~~stolen.
: w~~~
I am

that

petr' s

~

the components were
concession

that

the

18.

730,

The plurality's opinion

742

states

(1983} '

requirement

is

met

reasonable

caution

when
in

in Texas v.

that

the
the

the

belief

that

Brown,

~

Petr's~~

460

u.s.

apparent"

"warrant

certain

lacked

See

"immediately

circumstances

~

officer

probable cause to believe the components were stolen.
brf.

7.

a

man

of

items

may

be

contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime;
it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or
likely true than false."
not mean

to concede

the

Id., at 472.

absence

of

(Perhaps petr does

probable

certainly quotes the language from Texas v. Brown.
18.

Perhaps

argument.)

the State will

~y

The

Illinois v. Gates,
to

the

view

components

were

back

its

there

213

was

Petr's brf.

t~ adopted

in : : : ;

(1983}, also lends some support
probable

The

stolen.

the State

concession at oral

of the circumst:_nces"

462 U.S.

that

take

-

cause;

cause

contrast

to

between

components and the apartment littered with refuse,

the ~

believe
the

~

expensive

the presence

of modified firearms and a mask useful only for robberies, and
the

officer's

involved

in

recollection
a

prior

that

police

one

of

the

investigation,

tenants
provided

had

been

a

solid '

foundation for the officer's belief that the components may have
been stolen.
744-746,

you

requirement,

In your concurring opinion in Brown, 460
that

emphasize
but

you

do

not

formulation of the standard.

probable
take

issue

cause
with

is
the

u.s.,

at

still

a

majority's

J ~~

8.

I add a
Brown

short caveat on probable cause.

formulation

of

the

probable

cause

The Texas v.

standard

is

not

compatible with the view that events as consistent with innocent
as with criminal activity do not

justify a

search or seizure.

The Court has declined to specify a precise level of probability
constituting probable cause.

You may wish to consider applying a

~

"more probable than not" standard, at least in cases where the ~ ~~
;2...~~.
~------~'----------------------question is whether any crime has been committed.
(The realities ~~
of

criminal

investigations

probability

must

suffice

suggest
when

the

that

a

lower

question

level

is

two

or

more

suspects.)

If

you

decide

to

apply

a

~

a~

whether

particular suspect committed the crime, because there often
be

of

wil~·~
"more J ~

probable than not" standard to this case, I would conclude that
there was not probable cause,

and

that the plain view doctrine

does not justify the search.
Petr presses the argument that the Court should apply the
"balancing" analysis of cases such as Terry v. Ohio, 392

u.s.

1

/}~

(1968)_.__Because inspecting the exterior of objects in plain view ~~
is

only

a

slight

invasion

of

Fourth

Amendment

rights,

petr

argues,officers should be permitted to proceed on the basis of
"reasonable suspicion"
skeptical

of

this

rather

line

of

than probable cause.

argument.

I

am quite

The Court has generally

resisted an approach that would require an officer to weigh the
manner

and

intensity

of

the

interference,

the gravity of

the

crime involved and the circumstances attending the encounter, on
the

ground

that

"a

single,

guide police officers."

familiar

standard

is

Dunaway v. New York, 442

essential

u.s.

to

200, 213-

A-e>

~

J

9.

214 (1979}.

The balancing approach, although "reasonable" almost

by definition,
one

immense

Fourth

threatens to "convert[]
Rorschach

Amendment,

58

blot."
Minn.

the Fourth Amendment into

Amsterdam,
L.

Rev.

Perspectives

349,

393

on

(1974).

the
The

balancing approach seems particularly unsuited to searches in the
home,

where Fourth Amendment protections are strongest,

and to

situations, such as this one, that do not threaten the officer's
safety.

Therefore, I do not recommend deciding for petr on this

ground.
4.

Does

the

fact

that

the officers obtained a

warrant

before seizing the components meet the good faith exception?

As

I argued in my short memo on the three "Leon cases" before the
Court this Fall (the others are Illinois v. Krull and Maryland v.
Garrison),

the

situation.

If

good

faith

exception

police officers

should

are permitted

not
to

apply
"cure"

in

this

Fourth

Amendment violations by obtaining search warrants after the fact,
they will be inclined to search without a warrant, and then seek
a

warrant

the

if

they discover

magistrate

should

not

incriminating evidence.
consider

violation of the Fourth Amendment.

information

In theory,
obtained

in

It simply is not realistic to

think that the information never would be considered in practice.
Extending the good faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468

u.s.

897 (1984), to this situation would be incompatible with the

deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.

/)1..1;

10.

III.

CONCLUSION
If you conclude that the officers had probable cause to

believe the stereo components were stolen,

I recommend that you

vote to reverse the judgment of the Ariz. Ct. App.

If you do not

reach that conclusion, either because of petr's concession in its
brief or because you would require a higher level of probability
than would

the plurality in Texas v. Brown,

recommend a vote to affirm.

,,

then I

reluctantly

-

1~'-10:2
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CHAM9ERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

December 15, 1986

Re:

85-1027 - Arizona v. Hicks

Dear Sandra:
Will you undertake the dissent in this case?
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
cc:

Justice Powell

/
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

December 16, 1986

No. 85-1027

Arizona v. Hicks

Dear Chief,
I

Yes. I will undertake the dissent when the .J'
majority draft circulates.
~·
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc:

Justice Powell
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
February 21, 1986 Conference
List 5, Sheet 3
Cert to Arizona Court of Appeals
(Livermore,
Hathaway,
Lacag in ina)

No. 85-1027

0Y
HICKS (stole stereo)
1.
numbers

SUMMARY:

from articles

State/Criminal

Timely

Petr claims that officers may record serial

---·-in --------the course of con-

inadvertently found

ducting a lawful search, as long as they reasonably suspect that
the articles may be stolen.

2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

On April 18, 1984, police

received a report of a shooting in resp's apartment.

The manager

of the apartment complex let police into the apartment, and they
conducted a quick
tims.

search for

(i)

the gunman,

and

(ii)

any vic-

They found no people, but seized several weapons that were

in plain view.

In addition, one of the officers noticed an ex-

pensive

and,

over

stereo,

and copied down

suspecting

that

it

was

serial number.

the

stolen,

turned

it

The officers left the

apartment with the weapons, and checked the stereo's serial number through a computer.
len.

They discovered that the stereo was sto-

'!'he officers obtained a war rant to seize the stereo, which

they then did.
The TC granted

resp 's mot ion to suppress

its serial number: petr appealed.
affirmed.

the

stereo and

The Arizona Court of Appeals

The court found that police clearly were permitted to

enter the apartment without waiting for a warrant: they may reasonably

have believed

that

someone may

have been shot,

or

that

the apartment contained weapons that might be used against them.
'l'his justified the search for
victims.

Mincey v. Arizona,

resp,

437

u.s.

weapons,
385

and other possible

(1978).

But as Mincey

cautioned, a "warrantless search must be 'strictly circumscribed
by

the exigencies which

quoting

Terry v.

Ohio,

of the serial numbers

justify its
392

u.s.

initiation.'"

1, 25-26

"was unrelated

(1968).

!.£_., at 393,

The recording

to the exigency justifying

entry and

involved an additional search not necessitated by the

exigency.

It was plainly unlawful."

Petn at 28.

The Arizona Supreme Court denied the state's petn for review.

3.

u.s.

CONTENTIONS:

443

(1971),

Under

was

and

v.

New

Hampshire,

the plain view exception applies where

initial intrusion was lawful,
inadvertent,

Coolidge

(3)

the

discovery of the evidence was

the incriminating characte r of the evidence

immediately apparent.
Coolidge

(2)

(1)

403

are

Here,

it is clear that the first to;..o

prongs

of

satisfied.

~ether

the officer had "probable cause to associate the property

with criminal activity."
(1983) .

"A

'practical,

Texas v.

- hus,

Brown,

nontechnical'

the

460

only

u.s.

probab i 1 i ty

730,
that

nating evidence is involved is all that is required."
On these facts,
was sufficiently clear.

The

"squalid, ill-kept apartment."
found

weapons

is

741-742
incr imi-

Ibid.

the incriminating character of the stereo
stereo was

surrounding environment," because

had

issue

"out of place with

its

it was an expensive unit in a

Petn at 13.

in the apartment,

and

Moreover, the police

thus had reason to be-

lieve that its occupant might have been involved in armed robberies.

Finally, the level of suspicion must be viewed in light of

the minimal nature of the intrusion.
bers from an object is

The seizure of serial num-

"the least obtrusive governmental inter-

vention" possible once the police are lawfully in the room where
the object lies.

Petn at 14.

ly in resp's apartment and
was stolen,
missible.

Given that the officer was lawful-

reasonably suspected that the stereo

his examination of the serial number should be per-

In closing,

petr argues that if the Court does not grant

cert, it should hold this case for New York v. Class, No. 84-1181
(argued

Nov.

~pectation

4,

1985).

Class

raises

similar

issues

about

the

of privacy in identification numbers on automobiles .

.l:esp repeats

the

arguments made

in

the Court of Appeals

decision.

4.

-

DISCUSSION:

The decision below is correct.

The po-

lice were lawfully in the apartment in order to search for a gun<---·-·'--·----.. - .___ - - ---· - - - - - - -man, victims, or weapons.
Turning the stereo upside down to look
for

----------

the serial number was unrelated to that lawful purpose;
~--

---

-

state must therefore rely on some independent justification.

---·-------·

the
And

whatever standard one applies, on the facts of this case the justification

isn't

Basically,

there.

the

state

argues

that

the

expensiveness of the stereo combined with the "squalid" nature of
the

apartment gave

doesn't make sense.

rise

to reasonable

suspicion.

The

argument

There may be many homes where the TV or ste-

reo is the occupant's most valued possession; that doesn't raise
any reasonable inference that such items are stolen.
Because the decision below seems right under any standard,

---

the state's argument that the lesser intrusion involved here requires a lesser justification does. not make this case certworthy.

vfN

A hold for

New York v.

Class / is unnecessary: 1

Class deals with

lin Class, an off ice
reached into the respondent's car
to move a piece of
per that was covering up the Vehicle
Identification Num er (which would otherwise have been
visible from outs· tle the car) • When he moved the paper,
the officer
ered a gun.
The 1st Draft in Class
(Footnote continued)

an

identification

number

designed

to be

seen

from outside

the

automobile; the serial number on respondent's stereo was not similarly meant to be seen and recorded without any intrusion.
important,

the draft opinion in Class emphasizes

interest in highway safety, 1st Draft at 5, 9-10;
sive

governmental

(iii)
biles,

regulation

of

automobiles,

(i)

More

the strong

( i i) the perva-

id.,

at

5-7;

and

the consequently reduced expectation of privacy in automoid.,

this case.

at 7.
Thus,

None of these factors has any application to
Class does

not

seem easily transferable to a

non-automobile context.

5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend denial.

There is a response, and respondent has moved to proceed
IFP.
.F·e bruary 6, 1986

Stuntz

Opinion in petn

(Footnote 1 continued from previous page)
concludes that the officer's action was reasonable, and
therefore that the gun need not be suppressed.
The 1st
Draft now has 5 votes.
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No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks (Arizona Court of Appeals)
Memorandum for File
A bullet fired from respondent Hicks' apartment went
through the floor and injured a man in the apartment below.
Responding to emergency calls from the victim's wife and
neighbors, several police officers entered respondent's
apartment.

In view of the exigent circumstances, it is

agreed that the entry without a warrant was justified and
lawful.

Although respondent apparently had fled, a

.25-caliber automatic was on the living room floor.

Police

also found a stocking cap mask, a .45-caliber automatic, and
a sawed off .22-caliber rifle under the mattress of a bed.
The apartment was in a low rent area, was in poor
condition, and littered with drug paraphernalia and alcoholic
beverage containers.

Officer Nelson, with 12 years of police

experience, noted expensive stereo equipment in both the
living room and bedroom .

The officer recalled that stereo

components recently had been stolen.

Accordingly, while

other officers were checking by telephone the serial numbers
on the weapons, Officer Nelson examined the stereo components
he had observed in both rooms, and noted the serial numbers.
Although these components were in full view, the serial numbers were on the back side and it was necessary for Nelson
to turn the components over to write down the serial numbers.

t

2.

No. 85-1027

When Nelson returned to the police substation, police
headquarters had checked the serial numbers and found that
the turntable and some of the components had been taken in
an armed robbery a few weeks earlier.

A search warrant was

then obtained and the stereo components, drug paraphernalia,
the weapons and various other items were seized pursuant to
the warrant.
The trial court sustained respondent's motion to suppress
the stereo components and testimony with respect thereto.
The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed.

It held that the right

to enter private premises for one purpose does not justify a
"general rummaging through a person's effects however suspicious
they may appear to the entering officer.

The recording of the

serial numbers was unrelated to the exigency that justified
the initial entry ... it was plainly unlawful."

The brief

opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals, in addition to citing
one Arizona case, cited Terry v. Ohio, and distinguished
United States v. Leon.
The State argues that the stereo components were in
plain view, and that there was neither a search nor a seizure
when the officer obtained the serial numbers for purpose of
determining whether they had been stolen.

The officer was

lawfully in the apartment, there was an abundance of evidence
of criminal conduct in view of the presence of the guns and

3.

No. 85-1027

drug paraphernalia, and clearly there was probable cause to
believe that the occupant was engaged in criminal conduct.
The State relies heavily on the "plain view" doctrine.
Respondent argues, more persuasively than I would have
expected, that the serial numbers were not in plain view,
and that a seizure occurred when the officer picked up the
stereo components and this was followed by a "search" when
the officer examined the serial numbers.
The parties debate the relevance of a number of Supreme
Court decisions including Coolidge v. New Hampshire, and the
more recent cases of Illinois v. Andreas; United States v.
Leon, Segura v. U.S.
controlling.

I do not think any of these cases is

The factual situation in this case probably does

not occur frequently, and perhaps we should not have granted
the case.
My tentative view is that we should reverse the Arizona
Court of Appeals.

The police officers deserve to be commended

for doing what police should do.

They were lawfully in respon-

dent's apartment; it was littered with evidence of criminal
activity; the stereo equipment was entirely out of place in an
otherwise shabby apartment; and it was in plain view.

It would

be difficult to persuade me that picking up a stereo component
constituted either a search or a seizure.

L.F.P.

I

rjm 09/03/86

BENCH MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Ronald

September 3, 1986

No. 85-759, Maryland v. Garrison
Cert to CAMaryland
Set for oral argument in November

'

In your file memo, you express the opinion that the case
should be reversed on the ground that the good-faith exception
articulated
facts.

in

Leon

I agree that,

and

Sheppard

should

be

extended

in light of those two cases,

to

these

the Maryland

court's decision must be reversed.

The only problem with

thi~

disposition is that the State's cert petition does not raise this
argument clearly.

This disposition is, however, fairly presented

by the question presented, which asks only if "the Fourth Amendment

exclusionary

rule

requires

suppression"

on

these

Thus, I think the question is properly before the Court.
I

think the result is clear,

sion of that point.

facts.
Because

I will not burden you with discus-

The case also presents, however, a more dif-

ficult question, whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment
at all.

This memo addresses that question briefly.

your file memo,

In light of

I did not think it appropriate to research this

question in great detail.

If you think the question is likely to

be seriously considered by the Conference,
cally consider it more fully.

I would enthusiasti-

In any event, I have researched it

sufficiently to be confident that the result I recommend is consonant with your earlier expressions on the scope of the Fourth
Amendment.
As the pool memo points out,

the great majority of the

lower courts addressing similar facts have refused to exclude the
evidence, applying a variety of rationales.
Court precedent is Hill v. California, 401
In

that

Hill.

case,

the

police

had

But the only Supreme

u.s.

797, 804

an arrest warrant

for

a

(1971).
certain

They proceeded to Hill's apartment to execute the warrant.

At Hill's apartment,

they seized the only person present, quite

reasonably believing that he was Hill.

Unfortunately,

seized Miller, a different person entirely.

they had

A search incident to

the arrest of Miller revealed the object of the warrant, evidence

l
~

l

I

Hill argued that the

incriminating Hill in a certain robbery.

evidence should have been suppressed because the arrest of Miller
was unlawful.

The Court disagreed, noting:

The upshot was that the officers in good faith believed
Miller was Hill and arrested him.
They were quite
wrong as it turned out, and subjective good-faith belief would not in itself justify the arrest or the subsequent search.
But sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment and on the record before us the officers' mistake was understandable and the arrest a reasonable response to the situation facing them at the
time. Id.
I find this passage quite difficult.

As best as I can tell, the

Court was saying that the officers' subjective belief was insufficient to validate the search, but that an objective probability
that they were executing the warrant properly would validate the
search.

The State argues that this language should be applied to

the officers' search of the apartment in this case, supporting a
conclusion that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.
I disagree.

It

is fair

to say that the statement in

question was not necessary to the result in Hill.
the language was

incorrect under

As I see it,

the then-extant state of the

law.

The best treatment would be to note that it was dicta, but

that

it

is

reconcilable with

the present good-faith exception

created in Leon and Sheppard.
If you
that

feel

the

language was

the Court must deal with

it,

sufficiently considered

I would find

it irrelevant

here, because this case involves a personal residence.

Whatever

the Fourth Amendment originally was intended to protect, personal

residences

must

resp's argument

be

at

the

(which I

top

of

the

list.

Summarizing

th~

find quite persuasive on this point),

the police officers searched resp's apartment without a warrant.
There

were

search.

no

circumstances

that

would

justify

the

Thus, the search must violate the Fourth Amendment.
There

are

First,

position.
dence

exigent

is more

at

least

two

strong

arguments

against

this

it is hard to argue that a search of a resi-

intrusive than an arrest.

But the Court has re-

peatedly stated, in cases after Hill, that searches of residences
are

invalid unless they are either

(a)

performed pursuant to a

warrant, or (b) motivated by exigent circumstances.
.....9A!!. v.

Clifford,

464

u.s.

287, 292

E.g., Michi-

(1984)

(your plurality opin-

text of

the Fourth Amendment

ion) .
The
itself.

rests

on

the

The first sentence requires only that searches be "rea-

sonable."
quire

second

In the second sentence,

that

warrants

issue

only

on

the Amendment goes on to reprobable

cause.

One could

argue that this search satisfies the Fourth Amendment because it
is "reasonable," even though it was not performed pursuant to a
warrant.

But the Court has long conflated the two sentences of

the Amendment,
must

be

construing

reasonable,

and

the Amendment

most

searches

to mean

are

"all

searches

unreasonable

performed pursuant to a validly issued search warrant."

unless
If the

Leon and Sheppard Courts had based their holdings on the theory
that good-faith searches did not violate the amendment at all,
this argument would be more persuasive.
stead,

:.

But they did not.

In-

the Court held that, even though the Fourth Amendment was

1

f

;

t

I

violated, the evidence should not be excluded because such exclu7
sion would have only a marginal incremental deterrent effect on
unlawful police conduct.
Finally,

two broader jurisprudential concerns support a

finding of unconstitutionality.

First, this Court's decisions in

Leon and Sheppard provide a safety valve for the enormous practical pressures on this Court to validate the ineradicable element
of

trivial

error

that

necessarily

With that valve in place,
to

the

inheres

in

police

conduct.

I do not think that determinations as

constitutionality of

searches

should

also

consider

the

good-faith belief of policemen that their actions were lawful.
Second, I
tional

would

be

a

think a finding that the search was constitumajor

Fourth Amendment cases.

departure

tion.

this

Court's

earlier

I do not think such a departure is ap-

propriate here for two reasons.
thoroughly argued.

from

First, the question has not been

Second, the result does not turn on the ques-

Why should the Court make such an important change in its

jurisprudence in this case,

when the evidence will not be sup-

pressed anyway?

CONCLUSION

As I see it, the proper analysis is as follows.
1.

The

police

obtained

a

valid

warrant

to

search

McWebb's apartment.
2.
apartment.

They did

not have

a

warrant

to search Garrison's

3.

No exigent circumstances justified a search of Garr

rison's apartment.

The officers' good-faith belief that the war-

rant justified the search is irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment
question.

Thus, the search violated the Fourth Amendment.
4.

the warrant

The search was performed in a good-faith belief that
justified

it.

Accordingly,

from the search should not be suppressed.
sion below should be reversed.

the

evidence obtained
5.

The deci-

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Scalia

Circulated:

JAN

5 1987

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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1st DRAFT

" SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 85-1027

ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. JAMES THOMAS HICKS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE
[January-, 1987]

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), we
said that in certain circumstances a warrantless seizure by
police of an item that comes within plain view during their
lawful search of a private area may be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. See id., at 465-471 (plurality opinion);
505-506 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); 521-522
(WHITE, J., concurring and dissenting). We granted certiorari in the present case to decide whether this "plain view"
doctrine may be invoked when the police have less_than probable cause to believe that the item in question is eVidence of a
c:fiiile or is contraband.
I
On April 18, 1984, a bullet was fired through the floor of
respondent's apartment, striking and injuring a man in the
apartment below. Police officers arrived and entered respondent's apartment to search for the shooter, for other victims, and for weapons. They found and seized three weapons, including a sawed-off rifle, and in the course of their
search also discovered a stocking-cap mask.
One of the policemen, Officer Nelson, noticed ~ of
expensive stereo components, which seemed ou~e in
the squalid and otherwise ill-ap ointed !our-room apartment.
Suspecting at they were sto e ,
rea anarecorded their
serial numbers-mo~g_so_!!l~~o..!N1.2nents, including a
Bang and Olufsen turntabTe, Tn order to do so-which he then
'vv

d

~ \\

w c, V\
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reported by phone to his headquarters. On being advised
that the turntable had been taken in an armed robbery, he
seized it immediately. It was later determined that some of
the ot er seriat'numbers matched those on other stereo
equipment taken in the same armed robbery, and a warrant
was obtained and executed to seize that equipment as well.
Respondent was subsequently indicted for the robbery.
The state trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress the evidence that had been seized. The Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed. It was conceded that the initial
entry and search, although warrantless, were justified by the
exigent circumstance of the shooting. The Court of Appeals
viewed the obtaining of the serial numbers, however, as an
additional search, unrelated to that exigency. Relying upon
a statement in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 (1978), that
a "warrantless search must be 'strictly circumscribed by the
exigencies which justify its initiation,"' id., at 393 (citation
omitted), the Court of Appeals held that the police conduct
violated the Fourth Amendment, requiring the evidence derived from that conduct to be excluded. Pet. App. 27-28.
Both courts-the trial court explicitly and the Court of Appeals by necessary implication-rejected the State's contention that Officer Nelson's actions were justified under the
"plain view" doctrine of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra.
The Arizona Supreme Court denied review, and the State
filed this petition.
II
As an initial matter, the State argues that Officer Nelson's
actions constituted neither a "search" nor a "seizure" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. We agree that the
mere recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a sei( zur e. To15€Stire, triaf wast lfe first sfep in a process'by
wruch respondent was eventually deprived of the stereo
equipment. In and of itself, however, it did not "meaningfully interfere" with respondent's possessory interest in
either the serial numbers or the equipment, and therefore did

~

LAA- "-'--

~

~u.. ~t
~~
c:.-...- JZJAt '£11--
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not amount to a seizure. See Maryland v. M aeon,
U. S. - , - , 105 S. Ct. 2778, 2782 (1985).
Officer Nelson's moving of the equipment, however, did
constitute a "search.,.,. separate and apart from the search Tor
the ~s, and weapons that was the lawful objective of his entry into the apartment.
erel ins ecting
those parts of the turntable that came into view uring the
latter search would not hav
't ted an independent
search, because 1t wou d have produced no a 1t1onal invasiOn of respondent's privacy interest. See Illinois v.
Andreas, 463 U. S. 765, 771 (1983). BJ!t t~king 'action;· unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, which exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment or its contents, did produce a new invasion of res ondent's privacy
unjustified oy e exi ent c1rcums ance that validated the
en ry. It matters not that the searcli uncovered nothing of
any great personal value to the respondent-serial numbers
rather than (what might conceivably have been hidden behind or under the equipment) letters or photographs. A
search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but
the bottom of a turntable.
III
The remaining question is whether the search was "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.
On this aspect of the case we reject, at the outset, the apparent position of the Arizona Court of Appeals that because
the officers' action directed to the stereo equipment was unrelated to the justification for their entry into respondent's
apartment, it was ipso facto unreasonable. That lack of relationship always exists with regard to action validated under
the "plain view" doctrine; where action is taken for the purpose justifying the entry, invocation of the doctrine is superfluous. Mincey v. Arizona, supra, in saying that a warrantless search must be "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies
which justify its initiation," 437 U. S., at 393 (citation omitted) was addressing only the scope of the primary search it-
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self, and was not overruling by im lication the many cases
acknowledging that the plam view" doctrin can legitimate
action beyond that scope.
We turn, then, to application of the doctrine to the facts of
established that under certain circumthis case. "It is well
1
stances the police fu_ey: seize evidenre in plain view without a
warrant," Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 405 (plurality) (emphasis added). Those circumstances include situations "[ w]here the initial intrusion that brings the police
within plain view of such [evidence] is supported ... by one
of the the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement," ibid., such as the ~gent-:9.r~ intrusion
here. It would be absu!:!l to sayt11at object could lawfully
be seized and faken from the premises, but could not be
moved for closer examination. It is clear, therefore, that
the search here was valid if the "plain view" doctrine would
) have sustained a seizure of the equipment.
There is no doubt it would have done so if Officer Nelson
had probable cause to believe that the equipment was stolen.
The S~eded, however, that he had Qnly a "r...easona~n," by which it means something less than probable cause. See Brief for Petitioner at 18. We have not
ruled on the question whether probable cause is required in
order to invoke the "plain view" doctrine. Dicta in Payton
v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980), suggested that the
standard of probable cause must be met, but our later opinions in Te~, 460 U.S. 730 (1983), explicitly regarded the issue as unresolved, see 460 U. S., at 742 n. 7
(plurality); 746 (co,netJI!'Rmc.E~----We now.
tha
uired. To say othoc rine loose from
its theoretical and practical moorings. The theory of that
doctrine consists of extending to nonpublic places such as the
home, where searches and seizures without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable, the police's longstanding authority to make warrantless seizures in public places of such

an

l
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objects as weapons and contraband. See Payton v. New
York, supra, at 586-587. And the practical justification for
that extension is the desirability of sparing police, whose
viewing of the object in the course of a lawful search is as legitimate as it would have been in a public place, the inconvenience and the risk-to themselves or to preservation of the
evidence-of going to obtain a warrant. See Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, supra, at 468 (plurality). Dispensing with
the need for a warrant is worlds apart from permitting a
lesser standard of cause for the seizure than a warrant would
require, i. e., the standard of probable cause. No reason is
apparent why an object should routinely be seizable on lesser
grounds, during an unrelated search and seizure, than would
have been needed to obtain a warrant for that same object if
it had been known to be on the premises.
We do not say, of course, that a seizure can never be justified o~oba le cause. We have held that it canwhere, or examp e, e seizure is minimally intrusive and
operational necessities render it the only practicable means of
detecting certain types of crime. See, e. g., United States v.
Cortez, 449 U. S. 411 (1981) (investigative detention of vehicle suspected to be transporting illegal aliens); United States
v. Brigno~once, 422 U. S. 873 (1975) (same); United
States v~, 462 U. S. 696, 709 and n. 9 (1983) (dictum)
(seizure of suspected drug dealer's luggage at airport to permit exposure o special y-trained dog). No special operational necessities are relied on here, however-but rather the
mere fact that the items in question came lawfully within the
officer's plain view. That alone cannot supplant the require) ment of probable cause.
~derations preclude us from holding that,
even though probable cause would have been necessary for a
seizure, the search of objects in plain view that occurred here
could be sustained Oii"iesser ' grounds. A dwelling-place
search, no less than a dwelling-place seizure, requires probable cause, and there is no reason in theory or practicality why

J
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application of the plain view doctrine would supplant that requirement. Although the interest protected by the Fourth
Amendment injunction against unreasonable searches is
quite different from that protected by its injunction against
unreasonable seizures, see Texas v. Brown, supra, at
747-748 (STEVENS, J., concurring), neither the one nor the
other is of inferior worth or necessarily requires only lesser
protection. We. have not elsewhere drawn a categorical distinction between the two insofar as concerns the degree of
justification needed to establish the reasonableness of police ~
action, and we see no.. reas~ for a dis_till£!.ion in the particular k~
circumstances before us here. Indeed, to treat searches ·A...£~ d.-more liberally would especially erode the plurality's warning ~ •
in Coolidge that "the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges." 403
U. S., at 466. In short, whether legal authority to move the
equipment could be found only as an inevitable concomitant
of the authority to seize it, or also as a consequence of some
independent power to search certain objects in plain view,
probable cause to believe the equipment was stolen was
required.
The present case may seem a close one, not because the ap- t
plicability of the probable-cause standard is less than clear, '
but because the assumption that it was not met on the facts
before us is doubtful. When police officers, during the
course of a search inquiring into grievously unlawful activity
(wounding with a firearm), discover the tools of a thief (a
sawed-off rifle and a stocking-cap mask) and observe in a
four-room apartment not merely one but two sets of items
that are both inordinately expensive in relation to their surroundings and well known to be favored targets of larcenous
activity (stereo equipment), it is far from self-evident that
the "flexible, common-sense standard" of probable cause,
Texas v. Brown, supra, at 742 (plurality opinion), has not
been satisfied. As we have noted, however, that inquiry is
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beyond us since the lack of probable cause has been conceded.
All we hold today is that, accepting that concession, the challenged portion of the p~ce sear$!1 of respondent's apartment
was unlawful.
The State contends that, even if Officer Nelson's search violated the Fourth Amendment, the court below should have
admitted the evidence thus obtained under the "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule. That was not the question on which certiorari was granted, and we decline to consider it.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Arizona is
Affirmed.

~/'~7

.Su;rrtntt <!fourt ltf t4t ~ittb .Stalt.tr
Jta.sfriugt.on. !}. Of. 2.0c?~~
CHAMBERS OF"

~
t:J·~?

'!~1

JUST)CE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

~~
January 6, 1987

No. 85-1027

Arizona v. Hicks

Dear Nino,
In due course I will circulate a dissent in
this case.
Sincerely,

Justice Scalia

Copies to the Conference

/)..-(!)'

Januarv 7, 1987

85-1027 Arizona v . Ricks

De-ar Nlno:
In view of our telephone conversation 1 have takftn
a closP look at your carefully written opinion. lt is as
narrowlv written as it could be and still a~firm.
With relurtancP, 1 n~verth~lPSS writP to ~av that 1
cannot ;o'in you. Your "hottorn line" dectc1es for the rirc;tt5~P that the DlAi~ view ~octrine includes ~ r~quirement of
prohn~ln ~ause.
To be c;ure, thfq ~e~ide9 ~ quec;tion left
rrpen ln Cool1dge ann arguably in Texas v. Bro\'m. The effect
nf your opinion wil, be to a~~ - as least as 1 view it - a
fourth requirement to the plain view doctrine. HerP, ae you
aqree, the police ,aw#ul1v wen' in the nremiseA, finding the
stereo equipment clearly w~s "in~dvertent" in the ~ense that
itn pre~ence hAd not been anttcioated, and finallv, l think
it '"as "immedlateJv apparent" to t'lis particular police officer t~at the stereo equipment in all Jikelihood was ~to
len. You acknowledge this in your opinion.

It seems to m~ that the general rationale of the
Pl~in view d~ctrine, as articulate~ in ~oolt~qn a~~ perhaps
r.larif.i~1 by the Plurality and my concurt"tnq opinion in ~
:-~s ,,. Brown, qhould ~llow a police officer to verify ::1
C'1eat1 v r.-eaCPona'J1 e q•Jspicion that a particular article was

stolen. ~here mav bP. situations where this would ~equire
some substantial intrusion on prtvacy, but certainly this is
not such a case. All that is at issue is the •picking up•
of thP su~~~cted fruit of a crime to determine whether a
seizure wa~ 1usti~led.
Finally, 1 am troubled by the dl1emma that 1 think
will confront police if probable cause alwavs is required
before an ob1ect in plain view may be examined to verify a
reasonabl~ suspicion.
Most people would think the officer
in this case fieserved commendation. Moreover, it simply
makes little sense to me to find that a closer examination
of an article rea~onably believed to have been stolen is any

...

l

2.

greater intrusion than mere1v viewing the game article.
Rere, there was no opening of drawers, looktng into closets
or searching or examining anything except a suspicious object alr.eady in plain view.
I write in thf~ deta~l. Hi~o, because 1 do admire
the narrowness of your n;')i"lion. l al"'' concerned, however,
that it w~,l handicap police in circumstances such as these.
What should the officer have done? Without the serial numbers, there may not have been justification for a warrant.
But assu~i~o su~h iuettficatinn (that 1 t~ink elearlv existed in thi~ caRe) ~nuld ~~@ o~~frpr have r~m~ined on t~e
premises to prevf>-nt the stE'reo equi.Pment from beinq remove<'!
E>Vf!'n if obtaining a warrant took considerable time? See
Petter Stewart's oninion in Coolidge, 403 u.s. 443, 467
{last two s~n~enc~s beqinning at the bottom of p. 467).

F1na11y, as wa agree that in fact ther~ was prohac•~o, ts tt nec~~s~rv for this Cnurt to

b1e cause tn thfg
f

P.

bountl
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t!'1e
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imp1auc:dbJe

Sincerely,

Jl.l~tice

1 :fp/t.; ,1

r '
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lfp/ss Ol/08/87HICKS1 SALLY-POW

MEMORANDUM
DATE:

January 8, 1987

TO:

Bob

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
85-1027 Arizona v. Hicks
Having

further

considered my

position

in

this

case, I am inclined to remain in dissent for the reasons
stated in my letter to Justice Scalia that I have sent to
him this morning.
As SOC will dissent, we can await it.
want to write

But I may

separately along the lines of my letter.

The important point is that the Court's decision adds the
necessity

of

application

"probable
of

the

cause"

plain

view

as

a

condition

doctrine

to

the

articulated

in

Coolidge and clarified by the plurality opinion in Texas
v. Brown.
One hypothetical that I would like to include is
something along the following lines:

Assume

that

there

had been two identical stereo components lying side by
side on the same table.

The serial number on one can be

read without moving it, whereas the other simply has to be
turned over.

Under

been lawful -

as I

the Court's decision, it would have
understand the decision -

to "seize"

2.

the component with

the visible

serial number

officer had verified that it was stolen.

after

the

But the officer

would have viola ted "rights of privacy" if he had simply
turned over the other sereo component.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

.inttrttttt C!}o:n:.rt of tfrt 'Jnitta .itatts
Jlaslfington. ~.a}. 2.0,?~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA

January 8, 1986
No. 85-1027 - Arizona v. Hicks

Dear Lewis:
I am grateful for your taking the pain to explain at
such length why you cannot come along in the above case.
I entirely understand.
I would not feel right deciding the case on the basis
that probable cause existed because we would not only be
disregarding the state's concession, but would also, in
doing that, be depriving Hicks of his opportunity to argue
the point.
Although we both end where we began, I have no regrets
about trying to reach an accommodation, as I hope you do
not as well.
Sincerely,

.i'upunu QI01ttt gf tlf.- :Juiub .l'hd.-.Jla.-J{itt!lhtn, Jl. QI. 2.0bi~~
CHAMI!ERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

j
January 8, 1987

Re:

85-1027 - Arizona v. Hicks

Dear Nino:
One sentence on page four of your opinion gives
me pause. Referring to the question whether the
plain view doctrine would have sustained a
warrantless seizure of stereo equipment in a home,
you state:
"There is no doubt it would have done so if
Officer Nelson had probable cause to believe
that the equipment was stolen."
In other words, if the serial number had been in
plain view and the officer's telephone check revealed
that the equipment was stolen, he could have simply
hauled the equipment away without obtaining a
warrant.
Unquestionably, as we indicated in Payton, an
item found in plain view in a public place may be
seized if there is probable cause to associate it
with criminal activity. And, of course, probable
cause is the standard that a magistrate applies in
deciding whether to issue a warrant to seize an item
in a home. But is it perfectly clear--or have any of
our cases held or stated--that an officer may always
make a warrantless seizure of private property in a
home when he is lawfully on the premises and has
probable cause to believe that property in plain view
is contraband or evidence of crime? That may well be
the correct rule, but I do not believe this case
requires us to decide that question.

-2-

Perhaps, instead of stating •there is no doubt
••• • you could substitute something like •we may
assume •••• •
Respectfully,

1/l_

Justice Scalia
Copies to the Conference

January 10, 1937

85-1027

Arizona v. Hicks

Dear Nino:
I'll await the dissent.
Sincerely,

Justice Scalia
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

/

CHAMI!!IER8 0,.

.JUSTICE

w...

.J. BRENNAN, .JR.

January 12, 1987

Arizona v. Hicks, No. 85-1027

Dear Nino:
I would be happy to join your excellent opinion in this case
if you would omit the discussion of whether probable cause for
the search existed (final paragraph on page 6 and first partial
paragraph on page 7). I think it unnecessary to the disposition
here.
Sincerely,

Justice Scalia
Copies to the Conference

)tqtrtm.t ~Dnri

.n tift 'Jnibh Jtalt.e-

Jhtel{btghnt. ~. ~· 2ll.?"'
CHAMBERS Or

January 12, 1987

JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA

Arizona v. Hicks, No. 85-1027

Dear Bill:
I will drop the paragraph you wish deleted.

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

.jltJJUutt Qf&turl &tf

tlrt Jnittb .jta.tt.s'

Jlaglfinghm. ~. QJ. 2ll,?~~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

January 15, 1987

Re:

85-1027 - Arizona v. Hicks

Dear Nino,
I have no doubt that your "[t]here is no
doubt"

language

correct.

Plain-view

seizures on probable cause are

commonplace,

in

would prefer

the

home

and

is

elsewhere.

I

that the change not be made but will leave it
in your hands.

Please add me to your list.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Scalia
Copies to the Conference

.Ju:prtmt

~.ntrt

of tl{t ~ittb .Jhdts

,rulfinghm. ~. ~. 21lc?,.,
C HAMBER S

or

..JUST ICE ANTON I N SCALIA

Re:

January 15, 198~
No. 85-1207 - Arizona v. Hicks

Dear John:
Absent objection from those who have joined my
opinion, I will be happy to accommodate the concern
expressed in your memorandum of January 8 by saying,
instead of "[t]here is no doubt" that the plain view
doctrine would have justified the seizure had there been
probable cause, merely "[i]t is uncontested that" it would
have done so. This, it seems to me, would avoid the premature holding you are concerned about, while also avoiding
the implication that we have any substantial doubt on the
point.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

.~bpum~ <!f01trlo-f 14~ :Jhttutt ~nd~•

'~lhttTlfinghtn. ~.

<!f.

21l.;t'l~

CH .. MBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 15, 1987

Re:

85-1207 - Arizona v. Hicks

Dear Nino:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Scalia
Copies to the Conference

.hprttttt ~Mtri 4tf tltt ~a ~tatt•

Jru~ ~. ~ 2ll~"'
January 20, 1987

CHAMBERS 01'"

..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks

Dear Nino:
I have one concern about your op1n1on in this case in
addition to the one heretofore raised by Bill Brennan.
In the first paragraph of part II, you decide that the
"mere recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a
seizure."
But is that question before the Court? Upon
reading the question presented in the petition for certiorari (as contrasted with the slight modification of it in
the State's brief on the merits), I have doubt that it is.
It strikes me as somewhat inconsistent to cover it in the
opinion when, on page 7, we decline to consider the claimed
"good faith exception." Am I offbase?
Sincerely,

q~,

Justice Scalia
cc: The Conference
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To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens
Justice Scalia
From:

Justice O'Connor

Circulated:

FEB l'l \Vb~

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-1027

ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. JAMES THOMAS HICKS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE
[February - , 1987]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting.
The Court today gives the right answer to the wrong question. The Court asks whether the police must have probable
cause before either seizing an object in plain view or conducting a full-blown search of that object, and concludes that they
must. I agree. In my view, however, this case presents a
different question: whether police must have probable cause
before conducting a cursory inspection of an item in plain
view. Because I conclude that such an inspection is reasonable if the police are aware of facts or circumstances that
justify a reasonable suspicion that the item is evidence of a
crime, I would reverse the judgment of the Arizona Court of
Appeals, and therefore dissent.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), Justice Stewart summarized the requirements for a plain view
search or seizure. First, the police must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or otherwise be in a position from which they
can view a particular area. Second, the officer must discover incriminating evidence "inadvertently." Third, it
must be "immediately apparent" to the police that the items
they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. There is no dispute in this case
that the first two requirements have been satisfied. The officers were lawfully in the apartment pursuant to exigent circumstances, and the discovery of the stereo was inadvertent-the officers did not "'know in advance the location of

yo v\
I
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[certain] evidence and intend to seize it,' relying on the plainview doctrine only as a pretext." Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S.
730, 737 (1983) (plurality) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 470). Instead, the dispute in this case focuses on the application of the "immediately apparent" requirement; at issue is whether a police officer's reasonable
suspicion is adequate to justify a cursory examination of an
item in plain view.
The purpose of the "immediately apparent" requirement is
to prevent "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 467. If
an officer could indiscriminately search every item in plain
view, a search justified by a limited purpose-such as exigent
circumstances-could be used to eviscerate the protections of
the Fourth Amendment. In order to prevent such a general
search, therefore, we require that the relevance of the item
be "immediately apparent." As Justice Stewart explained:
"Of course, the extension of the original justification [for
being present] is legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend
a general exploratory search from one object to another
until something incriminating at last emerges. Cf.
Stanley v. Georgia, [394 U. S. 557], 571-572 (1969)
(Stewart, J., concurring in result)." !d., at 466-467.
Thus, I agree with the Court that even under the plain
view doctrine, probable cause is required before the police
seize an item, or conduct a full-blown search of evidence in
plain view. Ante, at--. Such a requirement of probable
cause will prevent the plain view doctrine from authorizing
general searches. This is not to say, however, that even a
mere inspection of a suspicious item must be supported by
probable cause. When a police officer makes a cursory inspection of a suspicious item in plain view in order to determine whether it is indeed evidence of a crime, there is no "exploratory rummaging." Only those items that the police

85-1027-DISSENT
ARIZONA v. HICKS

3

officer "reasonably suspects" as evidence of a crime may be
inspected, and perhaps more importantly, the scope of such
an inspection is quite limited. In short, if police officers
have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that an object they
come across during the course of a lawful search is evidence
of crime, in my view they may make a cursory examination of
the object to verify their suspicion. If the officers wish to go
beyond such a cursory examination of the object, however,
they must have probable cause.
This distinction between a full-blown search and seizure of
an item and a mere inspection of the item was first suggested
by Justice Stewart. In his concurrence in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969), which is cited in Coolidge, Justice
Stewart observed that the federal agents there had acted
within the scope of a lawful warrant in opening the drawers
of the defendant's desk. When they found in one of the
drawers not the gambling material described in the warrant
but movie films, they proceeded to exhibit the films on the
defendant's projector, and thereafter arrested the defendant
for possession of obscene matter. Justice Stewart agreed
with the majority that the film had to be suppressed, but in
doing so he suggested that a less intrusive inspection of evidence in plain view would present a different case: "[t]his is
not a case where agents in the course of a lawful search came
upon contraband, criminal activity, or criminal evidence in
plain view. For the record makes clear that the contents of
the films could not be determined by mere inspection." I d.,
at 571 (emphasis added).
Following Justice Stewart's suggestion, the overwhelming
majority of both state and federal courts have held that probable cause is not required for a minimal inspection of an item
in plain view. As Professor LaFave summarizes the view of
these courts, "the minimal additional intrusion which results
from an inspection or examination of an object in plain view is
reasonable if the officer was first aware of some facts or circumstances which justify a reasonable suspicion (not proba-
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ble cause, in the traditional sense) that the object is or contains a fruit, instrumentality, or evidence of crime." 2 W.
LaFave, Search and Seizure §6.7(b), at p. 717 (2d ed. 1987);
see also id., at 345 ("It is generally assumed that there is
nothing improper in merely picking up an unnamed article for
the purpose of noting its brand name or serial number or
other identifying characteristics to be found on the surface").
Thus, while courts require probable cause for more extensive
examination, cursory inspections require only a reasonable
suspicion. See , e. g., United States v. Marbury, 732 F. 2d
390, 399 (CA5 1984) (police may inspect an item found in plain
view to determine whether it is evidence of crime if they have
a reasonable suspicion to believe that the item is evidence);
United States v. Hillyard , 677 U. S. 1336, 1342 (CA9 1982)
(police may give suspicious documents brief perusal if they
have a "reasonable suspicion"); United States v. Wright , 667
F . 2d 793, 798 (CA9 1982) ("an officer may conduct such an
examination if he at least has a 'reasonable suspicion' to believe that the discovered item is evidence"); United States v.
Roberts, 619 F . 2d 379, 381 (CA5 1980) ("Police officers are
not required to ignore the significance of items in plain view
even when the full import of the objects cannot be positively
ascertained without some inspection"); United States v.
Ochs, 595 F . 2d 1247, 1257-1258, and n. 8 (CA2 1979)
(Friendly, J.) (same).
Indeed, several state courts have applied a reasonable suspicion standard in factual circumstances almost identical to
this case. See, e. g., State v. Noll, 116 Wis. 2d 443, 343
N. W. 2d 391 (1984) (officer upon seeing television could
check serial numbers); State v. Riedinger, 374 N. W. 2d 866
(ND 1985) (police, in executing warrant for drugs, could
check serial number of microwave oven); People v. Dorris,
110 Ill. App. 3d 660, 66 Ill. Dec., 442 N. E. 2d 951 (1982) (police may note account number of deposit slip because, when
the police have a reasonable suspicion that an item in plain
view is stolen property, the minimal additional intrusion of
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checking external identification numbers is proper); State v.
Proctor, 12 Wash. App. 274, 529 P. 2d 472 (1974) (upholding
police notation of serial numbers on calculators); People v.
Eddington, 23 Mich. App. 210, 178 N. W. 2d 686 (1970) (upholding examination of the heel of shoes), rev'd on other
ground, 287 Mich. 551, 198 N. W. 2d 297 (1972).
Justice Stewm's distinction between searches ba~~ p J
Q
1
their relative intrusivenes
nd its su se uen ado ~ oy
~
---~---l!.J!onsensus of American court
is entirely consistent With~
0
our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. We have long recognized that searches can vary in intrusiveness, and that
some brief searches "may be so minimally intrusive of Fourth
Amendment interests that strong countervailing governmental interests will justify a [search] based only on specific
articulable facts" that the item in question is contraband or
evidence of a crime. United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696,
706 (1983). In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654
(1979), we held that the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice should be judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Thus,
"[w]here a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a
Fourth Amendment standard that stops short of probable
cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard."
New Jersey v. T. L . 0. , 469 U. S. 325, 341 (1985). The governmental interests considered include crime prevention and
detection. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 22 (1968). The test is
whether these law enforcement interests are sufficiently
"substantial," not, as the Court would have it, whether "operational necessities render [a standard less than probable
cause] the only practicable means of detecting certain types
of crimes." Ante, at - - . See United States v. Place,
supra, at 704.
In my view, the balance of the governmental and privacy
interests strongly supports a reasonable suspicion standard

--
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for the cursory examination of items in plain view. The additional intmsion caused by an inspection of an item in plain
view for its serial number 1s fi'ril@;cule. Indeed, the intrusion in this case was even more transitory and less intrusive
than the seizure of luggage from a suspected drug dealer in
United States v. Place, supra, and the "severe, though brief,
intrusion upon cherished personal security" in Terry v. Ohio,
supra, at 24-25.
Weighed against this minimal additional invasion of privacy are rather major gains in law enforcement. The use of
identification numbers in tracing stolen property is a powerful law enforcement tool. Serial numbers are far more helpful and accurate in detecting stolen property than simple police recollection of the evidence. Cf. New York v. Class,
- - U. S. - - , - - (1986) (observing importance of vehicle
identification numbers). Given the prevalence of mass produced goods in our national economy, a serial number is often
the only sure method of detecting stolen property. The balance of governmental and private interests strongly supports
the view accepted by a majority of courts that a standard of
reasonable suspicion meets the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.
Unfortunately, in its desire to establish a "bright-line"
test, the Court has taken a step that ignores a substantial
body of precedent and that places serious roadblocks to reasonable law enforcement practices. Indeed, in this case no
warrant to search the stereo equipment for its serial number
could have been obtained by the officers based on reasonable
suspicion alone, and in the Court's view the officers may not
even move the stereo turntable to examine its serial number.
The theoretical advantages of the "search is a search"
approach adopted by the Court today are simply too remote
to justify the tangible and severe damage it inflicts on legiti.
w enforcement. "
Even if probable cause were the appropriate standard, I
have little doubt that it was satisfied here. When police offi-
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cers, during the course of a search inquiring into grievously
unlawful activity, discover the tools of a thief (a sawed-off rifle and a stocking mask) and observe in a small apartment two
sets of stereo equipment that are both inordinately expensive
in relation to their surroundings and known to be favored targets of larcenous activity, the "flexible, common-sense standard" of probable cause has been satisfied. Texas v. Brown,
supra, at 742 (plurality opinion).
Because the Court today ignores the existence of probable
cause, and in doing so upsets a widely accepted body of
precedent on the standard of reasonableness for the cursory
examination of evidence in plain view, I respectfully dissent.
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To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens
Justice Scalia
From:

Justice O'Connor

Circulated: __F_EB--=1_7_1_18_7_ _ __
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 85-1027
ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. JAMES THOMAS HICKS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
. ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE
[February - , 1987]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting.
The Court today gives the right answer to the wrong question. The Court asks whether the police must have probable
cause before either seizing an object in plain view or conducting a full-blown search of that object, and concludes that they
must. I agree. In my view, however, this case presents a
different question: whether police must haveprobahle cause
before con uctin a rs
mspectlon or an item in lain
view:' Because I conclude that sue an inspection is reasonable if the olice are aware of facts or circumstances that
justify a easonable susp1c1on hat the item is evidence of a
crime, I wou.Ia re% se t e JU gment of the Arizona Court of
Appeals, and therefore dissent.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), Justice Stewart summarized the requirements for a plain view
search or seizure. First, the police must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or otherwise be in a position from which they
can view a particular area. Second, the officer must discover incriminating evidence "inadvertently." Third, it
must be "immediately apparent" to the police that the items
they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. . There is no dispute in this case
that the first two requirements have been satisfied. The officers were lawfully in the apartment pursuant to exigent circumstances, and the discovery of the stereo was inadvertent-the officers did not "'know in advance the location of
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[certain] evidence and i end to se e it,' relying on the plainview doctrine only
pretext."
ex as v. Brown, 460 U. S.
730, 737 (1983) (pl lity) (quoti g Coolidge v. New Hamp, the dispute in this case foshire, supra, at 470).
cuses on the application of the "immediately apparent" re-:
quirement; at issue is whether a police officer's reasonable
suspicion is adequate to justify a cursory examination of an
item in plain view.
The purpose of the "immediately apparent" requirement is
to prevent "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 467. If
an officer could indiscriminately search every item in plain
view, a search justified by a limited purpose-such as exigent
circumstances--could be used to eviscerate the protections of
the Fourth Amendment. In order to prevent such a general
search, therefore, we require that the relevance of the item
be "immediately apparent." As Justice Stewart explained:
"Of course, the extension of the original justification [for
being present] is legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend
a general exploratory search from one object to another
until something incriminating at last emerges. Cf.
Stanley v. Georgia, [394 U. S. 557], 571-572 (1969)
(Stewart, J., concurring in result)." ld., at 466-467.
Thus, I agree with the Court that even under the plain
view doctrine, probable cause is required before the police
1
' seize an item:' or con uct a full-blown search of evidence in
/
plam view. Ante, at--. Such a requirement of probable
callseWill prevent the plain view doctrine from authorizing
general searches. This is not to say, however, that even a
mere inspection of a SUSTciOusitem muStbe supported by
prooable cause.
en a po 1ce o cer rna es cu ory mspection of suspicious item in plain view in order to determine whether it is indeed evidence of a crime, there is no "exploratory rum~" Only those items that the police

a

l

I
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officer "reasonably suspects" as evidence of a crime may be
inspected, and perhaps more importantly, the scope of such
an inspection is quite limited. In short, if polic~ officers
have a reasonable, articulable sus icion that an ob ·ect they
come across uring t e course of a lawful search is evidence
of crime, in my view they may make a curso exaffiition of
the obTect to verify theirsus ICIOn. If the officers wish to go ').. ~
beyon such a cursory examination of the object, however, . . . . . ~ ~ -- - '
1. ~ ~
they must have probable cause.
~~
This distinction between a full-blown search and seizure of
/ ~
an item and a mere inspection of the item was first suggested
L
by Justice Stewart. In his concurrence in Stanley v. GeorL...-t)
gia , 394 U. S. 557 (1969), which is cited in Coolidge , Justice
~ ~
Stewart observed that the federal agents there had acted
within the scope of a lawful warrant in opening the drawers
of the defendant's desk. When they found in one of the
drawers not the gambling material described in the warrant
but movie films, they proceeded to exhibit the films on the
derendant's projector, and thereafter arrested the defendant
for possession of obscene matter. Justice Stewart agreed
with the majority that the film had to be suppressed, but in
doing so he suggested that a less intrusive ins ection of evi.r:-_..,....__.._j
dence in lain view would resent a different case: "[t]his is
no a case where agents in the course of a lawful search came
>
upon contraband, criminal activity, or criminal evidence in
~
plain view. For the record makes clear that the contents of
the films could not be determined by mere inspection." I d. ,
at 571 (emphasis added).
Following Justice Stewart's suggestion, the overwhelming
majority of both state and federal courts have held that probinimal inspection of an item
able cause is not req\!ked
in plain view. As Professor LaFave ummarizes the view of
these courts, "the minima a ditional intrusion which results
from an inspection or examination of an object in plain view is
reasonable if the officer was first aware of some facts or circumstances which justify a reasonable suspicion (not proba.J

o" - -
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ble cause, in the traditional sense) that the object is or contains a fruit, instrumentality, or evidence of crime." 2 W.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6. 7(b), at p. 717 (2d ed. 1987);
see also id., at 345 ("It is generally assumed that there is
nothing improper in merely picking up an unnamed article for
the purpose of noting its brand name or serial number or
other identifying characteristics to be found on the surface").
Thus, while courts require probable cause for more extensive
examination, cursory inspections require only a reasonable
suspicion. See, e. g., United States v. Marbury, 732 F . 2d
390, 399 (CA5 1984) (police may inspect an item found in plain
view to determine whether it is evidence of crime if they have
a reasonable suspicion to believe that the item is evidence);
United States v. Hillyard, 677 U. S. 1336, 1342 (CA9 1982)
(police may give suspicious documents brief perusal if they
have a "reasonable suspicion"); United States v. Wright , 667
F. 2d 793, 798 (CA9 1982) ("an officer may conduct such an
examination if he at least has a 'reasonable suspicion' to believe that the discovered item is evidence"); United States v.
Roberts, 619 F. 2d 379, 381 (CA5 1980) ("Police officers are
not required to ignore the significance of items in plain view
even when the full import of the objects cannot be positively
ascertained without some inspection"); United States v.
Ochs
F. 2d 1247, 1257-1258, and n. 8 (CA2 1979)
riendly, .) (same).
'--.loHtn~~u, several state courts have applied a reasonable suspicion standard in factual circumstances almost identical to
this case. See, e. g., State v. Noll, 116 Wis. 2d 443, 343
N. W. 2d 391 (1984) (officer upon seeing television could
check serial numbers); State v. Riedinger, 374 N. W. 2d 866
(ND 1985) (police, in executing warrant for drugs, could
check serial number of microwave oven); People v. Dorris,
110 Ill. App. 3d 660, 66 Ill. Dec., 442 N. E . 2d 951 (1982) (police may note account number of deposit slip because, when
the police have a reasonable suspicion that an item in plain
view is stolen property, the minimal additional intrusion of
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checking external identification numbers is proper); State v.
Proctor, 12 Wash. App. 274, 529 P. 2d 472 (1974) (upholding
police notation of serial numbers on calculators); People v.
Eddington, 23 Mich. App. 210, 178 N. W. 2d 686 (1970) (upholding examination of the heel of shoes), rev'd on other
ground, 287 Mich. 551, 198 N. W. 2d 297 (1972).
Justice Stewart's distinction between searches based on
their relative mtrusiveness-and its su sequen a op 1on by
a consensus o meriCail courts-is entirely consistent with
our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. We JiaVelOng recognized that searches canvary in intrusiveness, and that
some brief searches "may be so minimally intrusive of Fourth
Amendment interests that strong countervailing governmental interests will justify a [search] based only on specific
articulable facts" that the item in question is contraband or
evidence of a crime. United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696,
706 (1983). In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654
(1979), we held that the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice should be judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Thus,
"[w]here a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a
Fourth Amendment standard that stops short of probable
cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard."
New Jersey v. T. L . 0., 469 U. S. 325, 341 (1985). The governmental interests considered include crime prevention and
detection. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 22 (1968). The test is
whether these law enforcement interests are sufficiently
"substantial," not, as the Court would have it, whether "operational necessities render [a standard less than probable
cause] the only practicable means of detecting certain types
of crimes." Ante, at - - . See United States v. Place,
supra, at 704.
In my view, the balance of the governmental and privacy
interests strongly supports a ~easonable suspicion standard · '

85-1027-DISSENT
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for the c~ation of items in plain view. The additional intrusion caused by an inspection of an item in plain
view for its serial number is miniscule. Indeed, the intrusion in this case was even more transitory and less intrusive
than the seizure of luggage from a suspected drug dealer in
United States v. Place, supra, and the "severe, though brief,
intrusion upon cherished personal security" in Terry v. Ohio,
supra, at 24-25.
Weighed against this minimal additional invasion of privacy are rather major gains in law enforcement. The use of
identification numbers in tracing stolen property is a powerful law enforcement tool. Serial numbers are far more helpful and accurate in detecting s o en property an s1mple police recollection of the evidence. Cf. New York v. Class,
- - U. S. - - , - - (1986) (observing importance of vehicle
identification numbers). Given the prevalence of mass produced goods in our national economy, a serial number is often
the only sure method of detecting stolen property. The balance of governmental and private interests strongly supports
the view accepted by a majority of courts that a standard of
reasonable suspicion meets the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.
Unfortunately, in its desire to establish a "bright-line"
test, the Court has taken a step that ignores a substantial
body of precedent and that places serious roadblocks to reasonable law enforcement practices. Indeed, in this case no
warrant to search the stereo equipment for its serial number
could have-been obtained by the officers based on reasonable
suspicion alone, and in the Court's view the officers may not
even move the stereo turntable to examine its serial number.
The theoretica a vantages of the "search is a search"
approach adopted by the Court today are simply too remote
to justify the tangible and severe damage it inflicts on legitimate and effective law enforcement.
Even if probable cause were the appropriate standard, I
have little doubt that it was satisfied here. When police offi-
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cers, during the course of a search inquiring into grievously
unlawful activity, discover the tools of a thief (a sawed-off rifle and a stocking mask) and observe in a small apartment two
sets of stereo equipment that are both inordinately expensive
in relation to their surroundings and known to be favored targets of larcenous activity, the "flexible, common-sense standard" of probable cause has been satisfied. Texas v. Brown,
supra, at 742 (plurality opinion).
Because the Court today ignores the existence of probable
cause, and in doing so upsets a widel accepted body of
pr~t on the standar 0 reasona eness for t e cursory
examination of evidence in plain view, I respectfully dissent.
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
I join Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion, and
write briefly to highlight what seems to me to be the
unfortunate consequences of the Court's opinion.
The situation in which the police found
themselves merits repeating.

As the Court agrees, the

police lawfully entered respondent's apartment under
exigent circumstances that included the firing of a bullet
from that apartment that injured a man in the apartment
below.

The room from which the gun had been fired hardly

resembled the living room of law abiding citizens.

In

plain view there were three firearms including a sawed-off
rifle, and a .25 caliber automatic pistol, as well as a

2.

stocking mask and a banana clip.

In addition, the

apartment was in a "low-rent" area and was "littered with
drug paraphernalia and alcoholic beverage containers."
(Bob, cite record).

The officer observed expensive stereo

equipment also in plain view.

He recalled that similar

stereos had been stolen recently (Bob, is this right?)
The Court's decision turns on the fact that
Officer Nelson moved two sets of stereo components (merely
turned them over or on their sides) to enable him to see
their serial numbers.

Nelson then telephoned the Police

Identification Bureau and learned that the components were
stolen property.

On the basis of this information,

another officer obtained a search warrant and seized the
stereo components.

Respondent was charged with armed

robbery in connection with the theft of the stereo

3.

components.

His motion to suppress these items was

sustained by the trial court, and its action was affirmed
by the Arizona Court of Appeals.

Today this Court also

affirms the suppression, holding that in the absence of
probable cause - a concession unnecessarily made by the
state - Officer Nelson violated the Fourth Amendment when
he simply turned over the stereo components lying in plain
view in order to see the serial numbers.

As I read the

Court's opinion, its decision would be different if the
serial numbers could have been read without touching the
object that the officer had articulable and reasonable
suspicion to believe had been stolen.l

1

Assume there were two components lying side-by-side
on a table, and the serial number on one could be read
without turning it on its side, but the other component
had to be moved a few inches for its number to be visible.
As I read the Court's opinion, one of the components would
be admissible in evidence and the other would not.
A
distinction as insubstantial as this trivializes the
Fourth Amendment.

4.

Justice O'Connor emphasizes the "cursory" nature
of this search - if it may be so characterized.

She

properly emphasizes the minimal invasion of privacy that
occurs when an object is lying in full view, and an
officer who is lawfully present has reasonable grounds to
suspect that the object was stolen, and simply examines it
to confirm this suspicion.

Here, there was no opening of

drawers, looking into closets, or "searching" of anything
in the normal meaning of that term.

Moreover, in this

case, the stereo equipment was in a room in which there
was an abundance of evidence that its occupants had been
engaged in serious crimes.
It is fair to ask, I think, what Officer Nelson
should have done in the circumstances.

Without having

checked the serial numbers, there may not have been

5.

justification for a warrant to seize the stereo
components.

It is certainly not clear that the officer

could have remained on the premises and forcibly prevented
removal of the components. (cite cases).

Today's decision

can be read as imposing a new limitation on the plain view
doctrine, a limitation that will not be easy for law
enforcement personnel - and indeed for judges - to apply
rationally on a case-by-case basis.
Accordingly, I dissent.

Note to Bob:
This is

rough and not well organized.

you can to improve both its style and substance.

Do what
Include

in it, or in notes, appropriate references to Coolidge and
Brown v. Texas.

Until the Court's decision today the

6.

"probable cause" requirement has never been imposed as a
limit on the plain view doctrine.
L.F.P., Jr.
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components.

His motion to suppress these items was

sustained by the trial court, and its action was affirmed
by the Arizona Court of Appeals.

Today this Court also

affirms the suppression, holding that in the absence of
probable cause - a concession unnecessarily made by the
state - Officer Nelson violated the Fourth Amendment when
he simply turned over the stereo components lying in plain
view in order to see the serial numbers.

As I read the

Court's opinion, its decision would be different if the
serial numbers could have been read without touching the
object that the officer had articulable and reasonable
suspicion to believe had been stolen.l
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had to be moved a few inches for its number to be visible.
As I read the Court's opinion, one of the components would
be admissible in evidence and the other would not.
A
distinction as insubstantial as this trivializes the
Fourth Amendment.

4.

Justice O'Connor emphasizes the "cursory" nature
~ \\

of this search =-<rr-1 t mayfc.e=sa ch.iMacleriz-ed/

She

properly emphasizes the minimal invas i.on of privacy that
occurs when an object is lying in full view, and an
officer who is lawfully present has reasonable grounds to
suspect that the object was stolen, and simply examines it
to confirm this suspicion.

Here, there was no opening of

-

0\

drawers, / looking in to closets, or- "!!ea re-A ing"

...,

----a:-n- the

normal meaninEJ of that ter-m.

a f

any tl:l i-ng-.-52---

Moreover, in this

case, the stereo equipment was in a room in which there
was an abundance of evidence that its occupants had been
engaged in serious crimes.
It is fair to ask, I think, what Officer Nelson
should have done in the circumstances.

Without having

checked the serial numbers, there may not have been

5.

justification for a warrant to seize the stereo
components.

It is certainly not clear that the officer

could have remained on the premises and forcibly prevented

~' removal
~

of the components.

Today's decision

can be read as imposing a new limitation on the plain view
doctrine, a limitation that will not be easy for law
enforcement personnel - and indeed for judges - to apply
rationally on a case-by-case basis.
Accordingly, I dissent.

Note to Bob:
This is

rough and not well organized.

you can to improve both its style and substance.

Do what

Include

in it, or in notes, appropriate references to Coolidge and
Brown v. Texas.

Until the Court's decision today the

6.

"probable cause" requirement has never been imposed as a
limit on the plain view doctrine.
L. F. P. , Jr.
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HICKSS SALLY-POW
Justice O'Connor properly emphasizes the minimal
invasion of privacy - if indeed any can be viewed as
having occurred.

Here the

officer merely picked up an

object lying in plain view to enable him to confirm or
disprove a reasonable suspicion that the object was
stolen.

The Court nevertheless perceives a constitutional

distinction between the turntable component and other
stereo components simply because to observe the serial
numbers on the former it was necessary to pick it up.
With all respect, it seems to me that this distinction
trivializes the Fourth Amendment.

Accordingly, I dissent.
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February 20, 1987
To:
From:

Justice Powell
Bob
No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks

1. Your draft suggests that turning over the stereo equipment
may not have been a search.
I eliminated that suggestion.
First, it seemed somewhat at odds with the statement in your concurring opinion in New York v. Class, 106 s.ct. 960, 970, n. *
( 1986}, that you "do not suggest that the Fourth Amendment is
inapplicable· in [the context of moving papaers, etc. to observe
automobile VIN numbers]."
Second, it seems to me that moving
appliances in a home may interfere with reasonable expectations
of privacy.
I wouldn.t expect police officers to make a "spot
check" of the appliances in our little apartment to determine
whether they had been stolen. Of course, we can easily re-insert
the suggestion that this was not a search, and you need not state
a definite view77~
2. I have ~ found no authority for the proposition that the
officer could not have remained on the scene and prevented the
removal of the stereo equipment. My draft assumes that there was
not probable cause.
If there was not, it seems to follow that
the officer could not have remained on the premises indefinitely.
Is this a satisfactory resolution?

lfp/ss 02/20/87

Rider A, p. 3 (Hicks)

HICKSR3 SALLY-POW
The officers also observed several expensive stereo
components of a type that frequently were stolen.

This

case concerns only a stereo turntable that Officer Nelson
picked up and turned over to see its serial numbers.*
The Court agrees that the "mere recording of the
serial numbers [so long as they were in plain view] did
not constitute a seizure."

Ante, at 2.

But "Officer

Nelson's moving of the equipment, however, did constitute
a 'search' • • • "

See, ante, at 3.

The Court thus holds

that there is a distinction of constitutional significance
between reading the serial numbers on a stereo component
where the numbers as well as the components, are in plain
view, and between "moving" or picking up a nearby

2.

identical component to facilitate seeing its serial
numbers.

To make its position unmistakably clear, the

Court concludes this discussion by stating that a "search
is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but
the bottom of a turntable."

Ante, at 3.

It is not disputed that at least Officer Nelson
has justified suspicion to believe that components of
these expensive stereos were out of place in this
apartment in which the evidence of criminal activity was
overwhelming.

Responding to a question on cross

examination as to the basis for his suspicion, Officer
Nelson said:
"[It was] based on 12 year's worth of police
experience. I have worked in different burglary
crimes throughout that period of time and, you
know, I'm just very familiar with people
converting stolen stereos and TV's into their
own use. Just the appearance of the apartment."
Joint Appendix, at 28, 29.

3.

'

*Respondent's brief describes this conduct as follows:
"Respondent submits the serial numbers in question were
not observed in plain view. The act of lifting and
turning the stereo component was a seizure and by so doing
Nelson effectively seized the numbers. Writing down the
numbers was just an additional seizure."

No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks

JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
I join JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissenting opinion, and
write briefly to highlight what seem to me the unfortunate
consequences of the Court's decision.
Today the Court holds for the first time that the
requirement of probable cause operates as a separate
limitation on the application of the plain view doctrine.
See Texas v. Brown, 460

u.s.

730, 742 n. 7 (1983)

2.

(plurality opinion); id., at 746 (POWELL, J.,
concurring) .1

The plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New

Hampshire, 403

u.s.

443 (1971), required only that it be

"immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them; the 'plain view doctrine ' may not be
used to extend a general exploratory search from one
object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges."

Id., at 466 (citation omitted).

general exploratory search in this case.

There was no
Indeed, the

facts of this case well illustrate the unreasonableness of
the Court's decision to impose a probable cause
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lAs the Court recognizes, ante, at
, the statements
in Payton v. New York, 44SU.S. 573, 587 (1980), are
dicta.
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3.

Police officers lawfully entered respondent's
apartment under exigent circumstances that arose when a
bullet fired through the floor of the apartment struck a
man in the apartment below.

What the officers saw hardly

suggested that the apartment was occupied by law-abiding
citizens.

A .25-caliber automatic pistol lay in plain

view on the living room floor.

The officers also found a

.45-caliber automatic, a .22-caliber sawed-off rifle, and
a stocking mask.

The apartment was littered with cases of

alcohol and drug paraphernalia.

AppendiX

:::lJ

Th ..---

fficers also observed two sets of expensive stereo
stolen.
investigation, Officer Nelson determine
equipment had been taken by respondent during
robbery and kidnapping.

the

Upon

:

4.

The State has chosen--unwisely, in my view--to
concede that the officers lacked probable cause to believe
the stereo components were stolen.

The Court, however, is

willing to assume that Officer Nelson's suspicion was at

((.
least a reasonable one,

J~ttl
ao~H'i-I-aav-e

o doutrr tha-t tt- was.

1\

It is fair to ask what Officer Nelson should have done in
the circumstances.

Accepting the State's concession that

he lacked probable cause, he could not have obtained a
warrant to seize the stereo components.

Neither could he

have remained on the premises i;Hiefinite:ty and forcibly
prevented their removal.

I cannot

, under the Court's decision, Officer Nelson could
done nothing to investigate his reasonable
Today's decision turns on the fact that Officer
Nelson moved the stereo components to read their

(

t if Officer Nelson had

be~n

,

able to

/
I

I

ecord the serial num ers without touching the objects.

'L
had been standing side
s de, but only one serial n

ber had been visible, one

I
components would have been
other would not.

~ dmissible

in evidence .

u

\

So insubstantial a distinction

/
trivializes
the Fourth Amendmen

JUSTICE O'qoNNOR
I

emphasizes the minimal invasion of privacy
I

\

an officer briefly

stolen.

In my view, it

sonable for the police to make such brief

I

~hat

I

object 1 1ing

view to confirm or disprove
t
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HICKSS SALLY-POW
Justice O'Connor properly emphasizes the minimal
invasion of privacy - if indeed any can be viewed as
having occurred.

Here the

officer merely picked up an

object lying in plain view to enable him to confirm or
disprove a reasonable suspicion that the object was
stolen.

The Court nevertheless perceives a constitutional
~

distinction between the turntable component

and ~ ther

stereo components simply because to observe the serial
numbers on the former it was necessary to pick it up.
With all respect, it seems to me that this distinction
trivializes the Fourth Amendment.

Accordingly, I dissent.
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HICKSR3 SALLY-POW
The officers also observed several expensive stereo
components of a type that frequently were stolen.

This

case concerns only a stereo turntable that Officer Nelson
picked up and turned over to see its serial numbers.*
The Court agrees that the "mere recording of the
serial numbers [so long as they were in plain view] did
not constitute a seizure."

Ante, at 2.

But "Officer

Nelson's moving of the equipment, however, did constitute
a 'search' • • • "

See, ante, at 3.

The Court thus holds

that there is a distinction of constitutional significance
between reading the serial numbers on a stereo component
where the numbers as well as the components, are in plain
view, and between "moving" or picking up a nearby

2.

identical component to facilitate seeing its serial
numbers.

To make its position unmistakably clear, the

Court concludes this discussion by stating that a "search
is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but
the bottom of a turntable."

Ante, at 3.

It is not disputed that at least Officer Nelson
has justified suspicion to believe that components of
these expensive stereos were out of place in this
apartment in which the evidence of criminal activity was
overwhelming.

Responding to a question on cross
I

examination as to the basis for his suspicion, Officer
Nelson said:
"[It was] based on 12 year's worth of police
experience. I have worked in different burglary
crimes throughout that period of time and, you
know, I'm just very familiar with people
converting stolen stereos and TV's into their
own use. Just the appearance of the apartment."
Joint Appendix, at 28, 29.

3.

*Respondent's brief describes this conduct as follows:
"Respondent submits the serial numbers in question were
not observed in plain view. The act of lifting and
turning the stereo component was a seizure and by so doing
Nelson effectively seized the numbers. Writing down the
numbers was just an additional seizure."
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No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks

JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
I join JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissenting opinion, and
write briefly to highlight what seem to me the unfortunate
consequences of the Court's decision.
Today the Court holds for the first time that the
requirement of probable cause operates as a separate

2.

limitation on the application of the plain view doctrine.l
The plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403

u.s.

443 (1971), required only that it be "immediately

a~~arent

to the police that they have evidence before

them: the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend
a general exploratory search from one object to another
until something incriminating at last emerges."
466 (citation omitted).

Id., at

There was no general exploratory

lrn Texas v. Brown, 460 u.s. 730 (1983), the plurality
opinion expressly declined to "address whether, in some
circumstances, a degree of suspicion lower than probable
cause would be sufficient basis for a seizure •••• " Id.,
at 742 n. 7.
Even the probable cause standard, in the
plurality's view,
requires only facts
sufficient to
"'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' •••
that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or
useft1l as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true
than false."
Id., at 742, quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 u.s. 132, 162 (1925).
See also Texas v.
Brown, supra, at 746 (POWELL, J., concurring) (leaving
open the question whether probable cause is required to
inspect objects in plain view). As the Court recognizes,
ante, at 4, the statements in Payton v. New York, 445 u.s.
573, 587 (1980), are dicta.
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illustrate the unreasonableness of the Court's decision to
impose a probable cause requirement on brief inspections
of objects in plain view.
Officer Nelson clearly had a reasonable suspicion,
based on specific

~

and ~articulab~e

facts, that the stereo

components in question were stolen.

He and other officers

lawfully entered respondent's apartment under exigent
circumstances that arose when a bullet fired through the
floor of the apartment struck a man in the apartment
below.

What the officers saw hardly suggested that the

apartment was occupied by law-abiding citizens.

A .25-

caliber automatic pistol lay in plain view on the living
room floor.

The officers found a .45-caliber automatic, a

.22-caliber sawed-off rifle, and a stocking mask.
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4.

,

apartment was littered with cases of alcohol and drug
paraphernalia.

6J(

App. 29.

The officers also observed

several expensive stereo components of a type that

\ lf~tV'o-t"~------------- ~
~.JOt~

f'row- ~, lo 1

frequently were stolen.

This case concerns only a stereo

turntable that Officer Nelson turned on its side to record
its serial number.

The Court agrees that the "mere

recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a
seizure."

Ante, at 2.

But "Officer Nelson's moving of

the equipment ••• did constitute a 'search'
at 3.

.... "

The Court thus discerns a constitutional

distinction between reading a serial number without
touching the component and moving or picking up the

Ante,

5.

~

component to read ehe serial number.2

To make its

position unmistakably clear, the Court concludes that a
"search is a search, even if it happens to disclose
nothing but the bottom of a turntable."

Ante, at 3.

It is not disputed that Officer Nelson's suspicion
.r~-
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was justified in light of the overwhelming evidence of
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criminal activity in the apartment.
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2In fact, Officer Nelson apparently wc/s able to read ~..:..-.
the serial numbers on some of the cqrnponents without v- ~ ~{; 0 \rnov ing them.
He testified that there was an opening of "\D~ \
about a foot between the back of one set of stereo
J
equiprnent and the wall.
App. 2 0. k Several of the
components later proved to have been stolen.
Only one,
however, a Bang and Olufsen turntable, was listed as
stolen on the National Crime Information Center Computer.
To read the serial number on that turntable, Officer
Nelson had to "turn it around or turn it upside down."
App. 19.
Although the Court does not discuss this
problem, it implicitly affirms the trial court's holding
that "anything that carne as a result of turning the
turntable upside down or turning it around" must be
suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree."
App. 36.
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 u.s. 471 (1963).

C~~>vc)V~\-

H c..t

\

I~ ")V(,...,)

"-.._;

..Tv'S~'<t.
'lov

)

--

s ""~~\
(t.\IV\

r

h

\

su~

'S~e. l.f'

0') )vVVl;"'~

)

v 1/'V'\ bc;- .r

bv-t"

v~s.!JLA-

\/\) (!"'\~

I

+l-.c

WQ..;c~

0'1
'SDVY\..>....

bov .f.
af

I
+~,

+'+-

:-t

t-V\.--, t-o-. 6 u_ WO\S
.P,..OVV\
+ ~.51--

\1\ \ ""' \,;(j\ 5

\

~t.

0"'

+\,_~

-bo.c.k .

6•

....-----

..

~.-

... ......
,

-- . ----- - - - - -- -----

"[It was] based on 12 years' worth of police
experience. I have worked in different burglary
crimes throughout that period of time and •••
I'm just very familiar with people converting
stolen stereos and TV's into their own use."
App. 28-29.

The State has chosen--unwisely, in my view--to
concede that the officers lacked probable cause to believe
the stereo components were stolen.

The Court, however, is

willing to assume that Officer Nelson's suspicion was at
least a reasonable one.

See ante, at 5-6.

It is fair to

ask what Officer Nelson should have done in the
circumstances.

Accepting the State's concession that he

lacked probable cause, he could not have obtained a
warrant to seize the stereo components.

Neither could he

have remained on the premises and forcibly prevented their
removal.

7.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR properly emphasizes the minimal

C.\~
\/

invasion of privacy--if indeed any can be viewed as having
-.. occurred.

Here the officer merely picked up an object

lying in plain view to confirm or disprove a reasonable
suspicion that the object was stolen.

The Court

nevertheless perceives a constitutional distinction
between the turntable and other stereo components with
visible serial numbers simply because it was necessary to

~~ up the turntable to observe the number.

~-e component ~th visible

(}.

If

0+19

-ef

serial numbers had been listed

on the computer, the evidence would have been admissible.
With all respect, it seems to me that a constitutional
distinction resting on such a fortuity trivializes the
Fourth Amendment.

..•

Accordingly, I dissent •

\

~~c.__

of'
c)

0

-{--k_
V\D-{-

~+ t"(Ach e

Cv\1\t's
o'~P<='o._,-

J
o

+Lu_

r,

V\

r { I e_.v Ct' \/'\

l

c"" J

o 'II""'

+ +o
'

J lv- p+-

Th.'L-

c (;to V\J ~ s·

'Jr

..:;.

-

February 23, 1987

Third Draft

No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks

JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
I join JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissenting opinion, and
write briefly to highlight what seem to me the unfortunate
consequences of the Court's decision.

2.

Today the Court holds for the first time that the
requirement of probable cause operates as a separate
limitation on the application of the plain view doctrine.l
The plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403

u.s.

443 (1971), required only that it be "immediately

apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend
a general exploratory search from one object to another

lrn Texas v. Brown, 460 u.s. 730 (1983), the plurality
opinion expressly declined to "address whether, in some
circumstances, a degree of suspicion lower than probable
cause would be sufficient basis for a seizure •••• " Id.,
at 742 n. 7.
Even the probable cause standard, in the
plurality's view,
requires only facts sufficient to
"'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' •••
that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or
useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true
than false."
Id., at 742, quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 u.S. 132, 162 (1925).
See also Texas v.
Brown, supra, at 746 (POWELL, J., concurring) (leaving
open the question whether probable cause is required to
inspect objects in plain view). As the Court recognizes,
ante, at 4, the statements in Payton v. New York, 445 u.s.
573, 587 (1980), are dicta.

3.

until something

last emerges."

466 (citation o

Id., at

There was no general exploratory

search in this

ase, and I certt:Rly

such a search.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR pro erly emphasizes that
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ould not approve
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in plain

a minimal invasion of privacy.

Ante, at

The Court

nevertheless holds that "merely looking at" an object in
plain view is lawful, ante, at 6, but "moving" or
"disturbing" the object to investigate a reasonable
suspicion is not, ante, at 3, 6.

The facts of this case

well illustrate the unreasonableness of this distinction.
The officers' suspicion that the stereo components at
issue were stolen was both reasonable and based on
specific, articulable facts.

Indeed,

~k

the State

was unwise to concede the absence of probable cause.

The

4.

police lawfully entered respondent's apartment under
exigent circumstances that arose when a bullet fired
through the floor of the apartment struck a man in the
apartment below.

~~q4--v~
What they saw~ ardly suggested that ~

·aapartm~t

was occupied by law-abiding citizens.

A .25-

1\

caliber automatic pistol lay in plain view on the living
room floor.

During a concededly lawful search, the

officers found a .45-caliber automatic, a .22-caliber
sawed-off rifle, and a stocking mask.
littered with drug paraphernalia.

The apartment was

App. 29.

The officers

also observed two sets of expensive stereo components of a
type that frequently were stolen.2

2Responding to a question on cross-examination, Officer
Nelson explained that his suspicion was "based on 12
years' worth of police experience.
I have worked in
different burglary crimes throughout that period of time
and
I'm just very familiar with people converting
stolen stereos and TV's into their own use." App. 28-29.

{

5.

It is fair to ask what Officer Nelson should have
done in these circumstances.

Accepting the State's

concession that he lacked probable cause, he could not
have obtained a warrant to seize the stereo components.
Neither could he have remained on the premises and
forcibly prevented their removal.
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f.ac:t:; Off i

telephoned the National

Crim~Information

~e r

Nel S:On-

6

and
Center to check

them against the Center's computerized listing of stolen
~y

•/

Officer Nelson was able to read some

of the serial numbers without moving the components.3

To

3officer Nelson testified that there was an opening of
about a foot between the back of one set of stereo
equipment and the wall. App. 20. Presumably this opening
was large enough to permit Officer Nelson to view serial
numbers on the backs of the components without moving
them. [The trial court held that even these components}-6
were not admissible because "anything that came as a
result of turning the turntable upside down or turning it
around" must be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous
(Footnote continued)
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read the

number on a Bang and Olufsen turntable,

however,

---

upside down."

1\

had to "turn it around or turn it

App. 1~ rA::ltbo~b several of tlre :?-'

components la-t:-er ~determ-ined to have been stolenb.
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the Bang and Olufsen turntable appe-ared en-the -c-empl1t e.:!2/\

1 M!te.
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agrees

that the "mere recording of the

A

serial numbers did not constitute a seizure."

Ante, at 2.

Thus, if the computer had identified as stolen property a
component with a visible serial number, the evidence would
have been admissible.

But the Court further holds that

"Officer Nelson's moving of the equipment ••• did

j-j-

constitute a 'search' •••• "

Ante, at 3. ~ ~he Co~£t

(Footnote 3 continued from previous
tree." App. 36. See Wo
v. United States, 371
471 (196

1-t.-<-

u.s.

~ ~~
.. ~~- ~ ~\

~~>'<>~~~~

)

~ ~ ~ akG:z?4-~

-H_~~~. Lt; ~~ -

-

:;

~ ~~~-~~Ht.d-~)

~~~~ct.- ~~~-dl.-L.~-

7.

'

or
To

make its position unmistakably clear, the Court co eludes

that a •search is a search, even i f i t happens to di ~
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With all respect,
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~~particular feature of an object in plain

'sible without moving the

depend on pure happenstance.
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will

objec ~sua~y

For example, if an object

happens to be located in a dark corner of a room, the
Court holds that an officer may not pick it up and carry
it to a window to read the serial number.

But if the

chances to enter the room at a different / time of
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Rider A, p. 7 (Hicks)
Draft No. 3

HICKS? SALLY-POW

Note to Bob:
I think your draft of the 23rd is quite good up
through the paragraph that ends on page 7. At that point,
you add a paragraph, as I had suggested, to cite
illustrations of the trivial nature of the Court's
distinction. Rather than include such a paragraph in the
text, I suggest that it be put in a footnote.
I also
suggest that it be reframed along the following lines:
4.

Numerous articles that frequently are stolen

have serial numbers:
credit cards.

e.g., expensive watches, cameras,

Under the Court's ruling, two wrist watches

could be lying side by side in plain view in circumstances
where a police officer had reasonable suspicion to believe
they had been stolen.

In order to obtain a warrant, it

may be necessary to obtain confirmation of the suspicion
by use of the serial number.

Assume that the number was

in plain view on one watch, but the other had to be turned
over to see it.

Under the Court's decision, reading the

number on the first watch would not be a search.

But

turning over the watch beside it, would be an unlawful
search.

Als ~

the ability to read the serial number of an

2.

object could depend upon its location in a room and light
conditions at a particular time.

Would there be a

constitutional difference if an officer, on the basis of
reasonable suspicion, used a pocket flashlight or turned
on a light to read a number rather than moving the object
to a point where a serial number was clearly visible?

lfp/ss 02/24/87

Rider A, p. 9 (Hicks)
Draft No. 3

HICKS9 SALLY-PCM

Note to Bob:
Consider a revision of the final paragraph in the
text generally as set forth below. I recognize there is
some duplication of what I have said in my suggested
footnote.

* * *
It is not easy to think of another Fourth
Amendment decision of this Court that could create as much
uncertainty for police officers who find themselves in
situations similar to those that confronted Officer
Nelson.

Of course, the basic premise is that an officer

is lawfully in a position where he observes in plain view
a number of suspicious objects, particularly the type of
objects that frequently are stolen.

Depending solely on

the visibility of identifying numbers or features, the
objects may or may not be moved however slightly.

Apart

from the importance of rationality in the interpretation
and application of the Fourth Amendment, I

~J

~&gr~fully
,1.

record my view that today's decision may well seriously

2.

handicap law enforcement without ehancing privacy
interests.

lfp/ss 02/24/87

Rider A, p.

(Hicks)
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The limited scope of the activity at issue in
this case merits emphasis.

All of the pertinent objects

were in plain view and could be identified as objects
frequently stolen.

There was no "rummaging around" by the

officers or looking into closets, drawers, opening trunks
or the 1 ike.
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Fourth Draft

No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks

JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
I join JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissenting opinion, and
write briefly to highlight what seem to me the unfortunate
consequences of the Court's decision.

2.

Today the Court holds for the first time that the
requirement of probable cause operates as a separate
limitation on the application of the plain view doctrine.l
The plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403

u.s.

443 (1971), required only that it be "immediately

apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend
a general exploratory search from one object to another

lrn Texas v. Brown, 460 u.s. 730 (1983), the plurality
opinion expressly declined to "address whether, in some
circumstances, a degree of suspicion lower than probable
cause would be sufficient basis for a seizure •••• " Id.,
at 742 n. 7.
Even the probable cause standard, in the
plurality's view,
requires only facts sufficient to
"'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief'
that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or
useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true
than false."
Id., at 742, quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
See also Texas v.
Brown, supra, at 746 (POWELL, J., concurring) (leaving
open the question whether probable cause is required to
inspect objects in plain view). As the Court recognizes,
ante, at 4, the statements in Payton v. New York, 445 u.s.
573, 587 (1980), are dicta.

3.

until something incriminating at last emerges."
466 (citation omitted).

Id., at

There was no general exploratory

search in this case, and I would not approve such a
search.

All the pertinent objects were in plain view and

could be identified as objects frequently stolen.

There

was no looking into closets, opening of drawers or trunks,
or other "rummaging around."

JUSTICE O'CONNOR properly

emphasizes that the moving of a suspicious object in plain
view results in a minimal invasion of privacy.

Ante, at

The Court nevertheless holds that "merely looking
at" an object in plain view is lawful, ante, at 6, but
"moving" or "disturbing" the object to investigate a
reasonable suspicion is not, ante, at 3, 6.

The facts of

this case well illustrate the unreasonableness of this
distinction.

4

0

The officers' suspicion that the stereo components at
issue were stolen was both reasonable and based on
specific, articulable facts.

Indeed, the State was unwise

to concede the absence of probable cause.

The police

lawfully entered respondent's apartment under exigent
circumstances that arose when a bullet fired through the
floor of the apartment struck a man in the apartment
below.

What they saw in the apartment hardly suggested

that it was occupied by law-abiding citizens.

A .25-

caliber automatic pistol 1 ay in plain view on the 1 iv ing
room floor.

During a concededly lawful search, the

officers found a .45-caliber automatic, a .22-caliber
sawed-off rifle, and a stocking mask.
littered with drug paraphernalia.

The apartment was

App. 29.

The officers

5.

also observed two sets of expensive stereo components of a
type that frequently were stolen.2
It is fair to ask what Officer Nelson should have
done in these circumstances.

Accepting the State's

concession that he lacked probable cause, he could not
have obtained a warrant to seize the stereo components.
Neither could he have remained on the premises and
forcibly prevented their removal.

Officer Nelson's

testimony suggests that he was able to read some of the
serial numbers without moving the components.3

To read

2Responding to a question on cross-examination, Officer
Nelson explained that his sus pi cion was "based on 12
years' worth of police experience.
I have worked in
different burglary crimes throughout that period of time
and
I'm just very familiar with people converting
stolen stereos and TV's into their own use." App. 28-29.
3off icer Nelson testified that there was an opening of
about a foot between the back of one set of stereo
equipment and the wall. App. 20. Presumably this opening
was large enough to permit Officer Nelson to view serial
numbers on the backs of the components without moving
them.

6.

the serial number on a Bang and Olufsen turntable,
however, he had to "turn it around or turn it upside
down. "

App. 19.

Officer Nelson noted the serial numbers

/}

J and telephoned the National Crime Information Center to
check them against the Center's computerized listing of
stolen property.

The computer confirmed his suspicion

that at least the Bang and Olufsen turntable had been
stolen.

On the basis of this information, the officers

obtained a warrant to seize the turntable and other stereo
components that also proved to be stolen.
The Court holds that there was an unlawful search of
the turntable.

It agrees that the "mere recording of the

serial numbers did not constitute a seizure."

Ante, at 2.

Thus, if the computer had identified as stolen property a
component with a visible serial number, the evidence would

7.

have been admissible.

But the Court further holds that

"Officer Nelson's moving of the equipment ••• did
constitute a 'search'

II

Ante, at 3.

It perceives a

constitutional distinction between reading a serial number
(JJc...

~ ~an

1-o 1'1-LL cA.. ~.
object and moving or picking up an identical object.

"'
To make its position unmistakably clear, the Court
concludes that a "search is a search, even if it happens
to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable."
Ante, at 3.

With all respect, this distinction between

"looking" at a suspicious object in plain view and
"moving" it even a few inches trivial izes the Fourth
Amendment. 4

4 Numerous artie! es that frequently are stolen have
identifying numbers, including expensive watches, cameras,
and credit cards.
Assume an officer reasonably suspects
that two identical watches, both in plain view, have been
stolen. Under the Court's decision, if one watch is lying
face up and the other lying face down, reading the serial
(Footnote continued)

~
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in
to the one that confronted Officer Ne

visibility of particular identifying numbers
determine whether the objects may be
Apart from the importance of
rationality in the interpretation of the Fourth

Arnendrne~

r
---~~~~~st£~~~~~rd-m¥-~~~~t

today's decision may

(Footnote 4 continued from previous page)
number on one of the watches would not be a search. But
turning over the other watch to read its serial number
would be a search.
Moreover, the officer's ability to
read a serial number may depend on its location in a room
and light conditions at a particular time. would there be
a constitutional difference if an officer, on the basis of
a reasonable suspicion, used a pocket flashlight or turned
on a light to read a number rather than moving the object
to a point where a serial number was clearly visible?

9•

s~otl~ly

handicap law enforcement without enhancing

privacy interests.

t'

lfp/ss 02/24/87

Rider A, p. 7 (Hicks)
Draft No. 3

HICKS7 SALLY-PCM

Note to Bob:
I think your draft of the 23rd is quite good up
through the paragraph that ends on page 7. At that point,
you add a paragraph, as I had suggested, to cite
illustrations of the trivial nature of the Court's
distinction. Rather than include such a paragraph in the
text, I suggest that it be put in a footnote. I also
suggest that it be reframed along the following lines:
4.

Numerous articles that frequently are stolen

have serial numbers:
credit cards.

e.g., expensive watches, cameras,

Under the Court's ruling, two wrist watches

could be lying side by side in plain view in circumstances
where a police officer had reasonable suspicion to believe
they had been stolen.

In order to obtain a warrant, it

may be necessary to obtain confirmation of the suspicion
by use of the serial number.

Assume that the number was

in plain view on one watch, but the other had to be turned
over to see it.

Under the Court's decision, reading the

number on the first watch would not be a search.

But

turning over the watch beside it, would be an unlawful
search.

Also, the ability to read the serial number of an

2.

object could depend upon its location in a room and light
conditions at a particular time.

would there be a

constitutional difference if an officer, on the basis of
reasonable suspicion, used a pocket flashlight or turned
on a light to read a number rather than moving the object
to a point where a serial number was clearly visible?

lfp/ss 02/24/87

Rider A, p. 7 (Hicks)

HICKS? SALLY-POW

Note to Bob:
I think your draft of the 23rd is quite good up
through the paragraph that ends on page 7. At that point,
you add a paragraph, as I had suggested, to cite
illustrations of the trivial nature of the Court's
distinction. Rather than include such a paragraph in the
text, I suggest that it be put in a footnote. I also
suggest that it be reframed along the following lines:
Numerous articles that frequently are stolen have
serial numbers:
cards.

e.g., expensive watches, cameras, credit

Under the Court's ruling, two wrist watches could

be lying side by side in plain view in circumstances where
a police officer had reasonable suspicion to believe they
had been stolen.

In order to obtain a warrant, it may be

necessary to obtain confirmation of the suspicion by use
of the serial number.

Assume that the number was in plain

view on one watch, but the other had to be turned over to
see it.

Similarly, the ability to read the serial numbers

of an object could depend upon the location in a room and
light conditions at a particular time.

would there be a

constitutional difference if an officer, on the basis of
reasonable suspicion, used a pocket flashlight or turned

2.

on a light to read a number rather than moving the object
to a point where a serial number was clearly visible?

lfp/ss 02/24/87

Rider A, p. 9 (Hicks)
Draft No. 3

HICKS9 SALLY-POW

Note to Bob:
Consider a rev1s1on of the final paragraph in the
text generally as set forth below. I recognize there is
some duplication of what I have said in my suggested
footnote.

* * *
It is not easy to think of another Fourth
Amendment decision of this Court that could create as much
uncertainty for police officers who find themselves in
situations similar to those that confronted Officer
Nelson.

Of course, the basic premise is that an officer

is lawfully in a position where he observes in plain view
a number of suspicious objects, particularly the type of
objects that frequently are stolen.

Depending solely on

the visibility of identifying numbers or features, the
objects may or may not be moved however slightly.

Apart

from the importance of rationality in the interpretation
and application of the Fourth Amendment, I

~lly

record my view that today's decision may well seriously

2.

handicap law enforcement without ehancing privacy
interests.

''.:.
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The limited scope of the activity at issue in
this case merits emphasis.

All of the pertinent objects

were in plain view and could be identified as objects
frequently stolen.

There was no "rummaging around" by the

officers or looking into closets, drawers, opening trunks
or the 1 ike.

Rider A, p. 9 (Hicks)

lfp/ss 02/24/87
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Note to Bob:
Consider a revision of the final paragraph in the
text generally as set forth below. I recognize there is
some duplication of what I have said in my suggested
footnote.
* * *
The Court defends the novel distinction it makes
today as providing a "brightline" for the benefit of
police and courts.*

In my view, it is not easy to think

of another Fourth Amendment decision of this Court that
could cause as much uncertainty for police officers who
find themselves in situations similar to those that
confronted Officer Nelson.

Of course, the basic premise

is that an officer is lawfully in a position where he
observes in plain view a number of suspicious objects,
particularly the type of objects that frequently are
stolen.

Depending solely on the visibility of identifying

numbers or features 1 the objects may or may not be moved
however slightly.

Apart from the importance of

rationality in the interpretation and application of the
Fourth Amendment, I

~~~~lly
1\

record my view that

today's decision may well handicap law enforcement.

,

2.

* The op1n1on does not use the term "brightline". Rather,
it justifies its distinction by (Bob, here quote what
Justice Scalia added in response to Justice O'Connor. I
do not have the opinions before me.)
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.JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA

February 24, 1987

Re:

No. 85-1027 - Arizona v. Hicks

Dear Harry:
My apologies for not responding sooner to your memo of
January 20. As I told you by phone, the memo either never
reached my chambers or was lost here, and I never saw it
until last Friday.
It seems to me that the petition for certiorari does
present the issue of whether the recording of the serial
numbers was a seizure. Indeed, it could be argued . that
that is presented more clearly than the search issue on the
basis of which we decide the case. The question presented
read as follows:
'·•

.

..

.......;...""":'"..,..-... .., ..

~,., .,~

Under the plain view exception to the Fourth
Amendment, can police seize identification
numbers from evidence inadvertently found in the
course of conducting a lawful search where police
can point to particularized, articulable facts
and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom which
lead them to believe that the evidence is
incriminating?
Moreover, it does not seem to me that the seizure
question is comparable to the good faith exception issue
which we explicitly decline to reach. The former is
central to the issue of whether there has been a Fourth
Amendment violation; the latter raises the subsequent issue
of whether, assuming a violation, th~ exclusionary rule
should nonetheless not apply. That is not conceivably
contained within the question presented.
All that said, it is nonetheless true (and perhaps
this is the root of your concern) that we could resolve
this case without reaching the seizure question, by simply
taking the two elements of the Fourth Amendment issue in
the opposite order -- that is, instead of rejecting the

- 2 -

contention that there has been a seizure but then finding a
search, simply finding a search and thus . rendering it
unnecessary to reach the seizure point. I only took the
course I did because the seizure contention seemed to me so
insubstantial that we were not making law of any
significance. If you continue to be troubled with the
point, and if no one else objects, I will be happy to drop
it. My own preference, however, would be to leave it as
is. Let me know your wishes.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

...

..I

.iuprtmt Q}ou.rt of tlyt ~h .itw•
11ht•qm¢on. ~. (!}. 2llpJI.~
CH,O.M!SERS 01'"

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

February 24, 1987

Re: 1 No. 85-1027-Arizona v. Hicks
Dear Nino:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

~·
•
T.M.

Justice Scalia
cc: The Conference

.h:pt-mu Qiomt of tltt ~a .itatt•

-u~ ~. QI. 2ll~"''
CHAMBERS OF"

February 26, 1987

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 85-1027, Arizona v. Hicks

Dear Nino:
Thank you for your letter of February 24. I continue to
be uncomfortable, but you now have a Court and I am content
to JOin your op1n1on.
The Arizona Court of Appeals may be
troubled by our deciding the issue, for it was not given an
opportunity to pass on the question whether it was a seizure.
Sincerely,

Justice Scalia
cc:

The Conference

CHAM !SERS 0,-

JUSTICE

w .. . J .

BRENNAN, JR.

February 26, 1987

Arizona v. Hicks, No. 85-1027

Dear Nino,
I fear that I failed formally to JOln your opinion for the
Court in the above. I wish simply to correct that omission.
Please join me.

Sincerely,

Jkt
Justice Scalia
The Conference

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
Justice Scalia
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 85-1027
ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. JAMES THOMAS HICKS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE
[February - , 1987]

JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
I join JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissenting opinion, and write
briefly to highlight what seem to me the unfortunate consequences of the Court's decision.
Today the Court holds for the first time that the requirement of probable cause operates as a separate limitation on
the application of the plain view doctrine. 1 The plurality
opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971),
required only that it be "immediately apparent to the police
that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine
may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from
one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges." !d., at 466 (citation omitted). There was no general exploratory search in this case, and I would not approve
1
In Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 (1983), the plurality opinion
expressly declined to "address whether, in some circumstances, a degree
of suspicion lower than probable cause would be sufficient basis for a
seizure .... " Id., at 742, n. 7. Even the probable cause standard, in
the plurality's view, requires only facts sufficient to "'warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief' . . . that certain items may be contraband
or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false." I d.,
at 742 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 162 (1925)). See
also Texas v. Brown, supra, at 746 (POWELL, J., r:oncurring) (leaving open
the question whether probable cause is required to inspect objects in plain
view). As the Court recognizes, ante, at 4, the statements in Payton v.
New York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980), are dicta.

85-1027-DISSENT
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such a search. All the pertinent objects were in plain view
and could be identified as objects frequently stolen. There
was no looking into closets, opening of dra'Yers or trunks, or
other "rummaging around." JUSTICE O'CONNOR properly
emphasizes that the moving of a suspicious object in plain
view results in a minimal invasion of privacy. Ante, at--.
The Court nevertheless holds that "merely looking at" an object in plain view is lawful, ante, at 6, but "moving" or "disturbing" the object to investigate a reasonable suspicion is
not, ante, at 3, 6. The facts of this case well illustrate the
unreasonableness of this distinction.
The officers' suspicion that the stereo components at issue
were stolen was both reasonable and based on specific, articulable facts. Indeed, the State was unwise to concede the
absence of probable cause. The police lawfully entered
respondent's apartment under exigent circumstances that
arose when a bullet fired through the floor of the apartment
struck a man in the apartment below. What they saw in the
apartment hardly suggested that it was occupied by lawabiding citizens. A .25-caliber automatic pistol lay in plain
view on the living room floor. During a concededly lawful
search, the officers found a .45-caliber automatic, a .22caliber sawed-off rifle, and a stocking mask. The apartment
was littered with drug paraphernalia. App. 29. The officers also observed two sets of expensive stereo components
of a type that frequently were stolen. 2
It is fair to ask what Officer Nelson should have done in
these circumstances. Accepting the State's concession that
he lacked probable cause, he could not have obtained a warrant to seize the stereo components. Neither could he have
remained on the premises and forcibly prevented their re2
Responding to a question on cross-examination, Officer Nelson explained that his suspicion was "based on 12 years' worth of police experience. I have worked in different burglary crimes throughout that period
of time and ... I'm just very familiar with people converting stolen stereos
and TV's into their own use." App. 28-29.
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moval. Officer Nelson's testimony indicates that he was able
to read some of the serial numbers without moving the components.3 To read the serial number on a Bang and Olufsen
turntable, however, he had to "turn it around or turn it
upside down." App. 19. Officer Nelson noted the serial
numbers on the stereo components and telephoned the Nationa! Crime Information Center to check them against the
Center's computerized listing of stolen property. The computer confirmed his suspicion that at least the Bang and
Olufsen turntable had been stolen. On the basis of this information, the officers obtained a warrant to seize the turntable and other stereo components that also proved to be
stolen.
The Court holds that there was an unlawful search of the
turntable. It agrees that the "mere recording of the serial
numbers did not constitute a seizure." Ante, at 2. Thus, if
the computer had identified as stolen property a component
with a visible serial number, the evidence would have been
admissible. But the Court further holds that "Officer
Nelson's moving of the equipment ... did constitute a
'search' .. . ." Ante, at 3. It perceives a constitutional distinction between reading a serial number on an object and
moving or picking up an identical object to see its serial number. To make its position unmistakably clear, the Court concludes that a "search is a search, even if it happens to disclose
nothing but the bottom of a turntable." Ante, at 3. With
all respect, this distinction between "looking" at a suspicious
object in plain view and "moving" it even a few inches trivializes the Fourth Amendment. 4 The Court's new rule will
Officer Nelson testified that there was an opening of about a foot
between the back of one set of stereo equipment and the wall. App. 20.
Presumably this opening was large enough to permit Officer Nelson to
view serial numbers on the backs of the components without moving them.
' Numerous articles that frequently are stolen have identifying numbers, including expensive watches and cameras, and also credit cards. Assume for example that an officer reasonably suspects that two identical
watches, both in plain view, have been stolen. Under the Court's deci3

1
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cause uncertainty, and could deter conscientious police officers from lawfully obtaining evidence necessary to convict
guilty persons. Apart from the importance of rationality in
the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, today's decision may handicap law enforcement without enhancing privacy interests. Accordingly, I dissent.

sion, if one watch is lying face up and the other lying face down, reading
the serial number on one of the watches would not be a search. But turning over the other watch to read its serial number would be a search.
Moreover, the officer's ability to read a serial number may depend on its
location in a room and light conditions at a particular time. Would there
be a constitutional difference if an officer, on the basis of a reasonable suspicion, used a pocket flashlight or turned on a light to read a number rather
than moving the object to a point where a serial number was clearly
visible?

To: The Chief Justice
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JUSTI~E POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins,
( dissenting.
I join JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissenting opinion, and write
briefly to highlight what seem to me the unfortunate consequences of the Court's decision.
Today the Court holds for the first time that the requirement of probable cause operates as a separate limitation on
the application of the plain-view doctrine. 1 The plurality
opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971),
required only that it be "immediately apparent to the police
that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine
may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from
one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges." !d., at 466 (citation omitted). There was no gen' In Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 (1983), the plurality opinion expressly declined to "address whether, in some circumstances, a degree of
suspicion lower than probable cause would be sufficient basis for a seizure . . .. " ld., at 742, n. 7. Even the probable-cause standard, in the
plurality's view, requires only facts sufficient to "'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' ... that certain items may be contraband or
stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any
showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false." I d.,
at 742 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 162 (1925)). See
also Texas v. Brown, supr,., at 746 (POWELL, J., concurring in judgment)
(leaving open the question whether probable cause is required to inspect
objects in plain view). As the Court recognizes, ante, at 4, the statements
in Payton v. N ew York , 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980), are dicta.
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eral exploratory search in this case, and I would not approve
such a search. All the pertinent objects were in plain view
and could be identified as objects frequently stolen. There
was no looking into closets, opening of drawers or trunks, or
other "rummaging around." JUSTICE O'CONNOR properly
emphasizes that the moving of a suspicious object in plain
view results in a minimal invasion of privacy. Post, at--.
The Court nevertheless holds that "merely looking at" an object in plain view is lawful, ante, at 6, but "moving" or "disturbing" the object to investigate a reasonable suspicion is
not, ante, at 3, 6. The facts of this case well illustrate the
unreasonableness of this distinction.
The officers' suspicion that the stereo components at issue
were stolen was both reasonable and based on specific, articulable facts. Indeed, the State was unwise to concede the
absence of probable cause. The police lawfully entered respondent's apartment under exigent circumstances that
arose when a bullet fired through the floor of the apartment
struck a man in the apartment below. What they saw in the
apartment hardly suggested that it was occupied by law-abiding citizens. A .25-caliber automatic pistol lay in plain view
on the living room floor. During a concededly lawful search,
the officers found a .45-caliber automatic, a .22-caliber
sawed-off rifle, and a stocking mask. The apartment was littered with drug paraphernalia. App. 29. The officers also
observed two sets of expensive stereo components of a type
that frequently were stolen. 2
It is fair to ask what Officer Nelson should have done in
these circumstances. Accepting the State's concession that
he lacked probable cause, he could not have obtained a warrant to seize the stereo components. Neither could he have
2

Responding to a question on cross-examination, Officer Nelson explained that his suspicion was "based on 12 years' worth of police experience. I have worked in different burglary crimes throughout that period
of time and ... I'm just very familiar with people converting stolen stereos
and TV's into their own use." App. 28-29.
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remained on the premises and forcibly prevented their removal. Officer Nelson's testimony indicates that he was able
to read some of the serial numbers without moving the components. 3 To read the serial number on a Bang and Olufsen
turntable, however, he had to "turn it around or turn it
upside down." Id., at 19. Officer Nelson noted the serial
numbers on the stereo components and telephoned the Nationa! Crime Information Center to check them against the
Center's computerized listing of stolen property. The computer confirmed his suspicion that at least the Bang and Olufsen turntable had been stolen. On the basis of this information, the officers obtained a warrant to seize the turntable
and other stereo components that also proved to be stolen.
The Court holds that there was an unlawful search of the
turntable. It agrees that the "mere recording of the serial
numbers did not constitute a seizure." Ante, at 2. Thus, if
the computer had identified as stolen property a component
with a visible serial number, the evidence would have been
admissible. But the Court further holds that "Officer
Nelson's moving of the equipment . . . did constitute a
'search' ... ." Ante, at 3. It perceives a constitutional
distinction between reading a serial number on an object and
moving or picking up an identical object to see its serial number. To make its position unmistakably clear, the Court concludes that a "search is a search, even if it happens to disclose
nothing but the bottom of a turntable." Ante, at 3. With all
respect, this distinction between "looking" at a suspicious object in plain view and "moving" it even a few inches trivializes
the Fourth Amendment. 4 The Court's new rule will cause
Officer Nelson testified that there was an opening of about a foot
between the back of one set of stereo equipment and the wall. !d., at 20.
Presumably this opening was large enough to permit Officer Nelson to
view serial numbers on the backs of the components without moving them.
• Numerous articles that frequently are stolen have identifying numbers, including expensive watches and cameras, and also credit cards. Assume for example that an officer reasonably suspe~.-~s that two identical
watches, both in plain view, have been stolen. Under the Court's deci3
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uncertainty, and could deter conscientious police officers
from lawfully obtaining evidence necessary to convict guilty
persons. Apart from the importance of rationality in the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, today's decision may
handicap law enforcement without enhancing privacy interests. Accordingly, I dissent.

sion, if one watch is lying face up and the other lying face down , reading
the serial number on one of the watches would not be a search. But turning over the other watch to read its serial number would be a search.
Moreover, the officer's ability to read a serial number may depend on its
location in a room and light conditions at a particular time. Would there
be a constitutional difference if an officer, on the basis of a reasonable suspicion, used a pocket flashlight or turned on a light to read a number rather
than moving the object . t.o a point where a serial number was clearly
visible?
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ARIZONA, PETITIONER v. JAMES THOMAS HICKS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE
[March 3, 1987]

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), we
said that in certain circumstances a warrantless seizure by
police of an item that comes within plain view during their
lawful search of a private area may be reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. See id., at 465-471 (plurality opinion);
id., at 505-506 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); id.,
at 521-522 (WHITE, J., concurring and dissenting). We
granted certiorari, 475 U. S. - - (1986), in the present case
to decide whether this "plain view" doctrine may be invoked
when the police have less than probable cause to believe that
the item in question is evidence of a crime or is contraband.
I
On April 18, 1984, a bullet was fired through the floor of
respondent's apartment, striking and injuring a man in the
apartment below. Police officers arrived and entered respondent's apartment to search for the shooter, for other
victims, and for weapons. They found and seized three
weapons, including a sawed-off rifle, and in the course of
their search also discovered a stocking-cap mask.
One of the policemen, Officer Nelson, noticed two sets of
expensive stereo components, which seemed out of place in
the squalid and otherwise ill-appointed four-room apa.Ltment.
Suspecting that they were stolen, he read and recorded their
serial numbers-moving some of the components, including a
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Bang and Olufsen turntable, in order to do so-which he then
reported by phone to his headquarters. On being advised
that the turntable had been taken in an armed robbery, he
seized it immediately. It was later determined that some of
the other serial numbers matched those on other stereo
equipment taken in the same armed robbery, and a warrant
was obtained and executed to seize that equipment as well.
Respondent was subsequently indicted for the robbery.
The state trial court granted respondent's motion to suppress the evidence that had been seized. The Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed. It was conceded that the initial
entry and search, although warrantless, were justified by the
exigent circumstance of the shooting. The Court of Appeals
viewed the obtaining of the serial numbers, however, as an
additional search, unrelated to that exigency. Relying upon
a statement in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 (1978), that
a "warrantless search must be 'strictly circumscribed by the
exigencies which justify its initiation,"' id., at 393 (citation
omitted), the Court of Appeals held that the police conduct
violated the Fourth Amendment, requiring the evidence derived from that conduct to be excluded. 146 Ariz. 533,
534-535, 707 P. 2d 331, 332-333 (1985). Both courts-the
trial court explicitly and the Court of Appeals by necessary
implication-rejected the State's contention that Officer Nelson's actions were justified under the "plain view" doctrine of
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra. The Arizona Supreme
Court denied review, and the State filed this petition.
II

As an initial matter, the State argues that Officer Nelson's
actions constituted neither a "search" nor a "seizure" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. We agree that the
mere recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a seizure. To be sure, that was the first step in a process by
which respondent was eventually deprived of the stereo
equipment. In and of itself, however, it did not "meaning-

85-1027-0PINION
ARIZONA v. HICKS

3

fully interfere" ·with respondent's possessory interest in
either the serial numbers or the equipment, and therefore did
not amount to a seizure. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U. S.
463, 469 (1985).

Officer Nelson's moving of the equipment, however, did
constitute a "search" separate and apart from the search for
the shooter, victims, and weapons that was the lawful objective of his entry into the apartment. Merely inspecting
those parts of the turntable that came into view during the
latter search would not have c.onstituted an independent
search, because it would have produced no additional invasion of respondent's privacy interest. See Illinois v.
Andreas, 463 U. S. 765, 771 (1983). But taking action, unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, which exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment or its contents, did produce a new invasion of respondent's privacy
unjustified by the exigent circumstance that validated the
entry. This is why, contrary to JUSTICE POWELL's sugges- 1
tion, post, at--, the "distinction between 'looking' at a suspicious object in plain view and 'moving' it even a few inches"
is much more than trivial for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. It matters not that the search uncovered .nothing of
any great personal value to the respondent-serial numbers
rather than (what might conceivably have been hidden behind or under the equipment) letters or photographs. A
search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but
the bottom of a turntable.
III
The remaining question is whether the search was "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.
On this aspect of the case we reject, at the outset, the apparent position of the Arizona Court of Appeals that because
the officers' action directed to the stereo equipment was unrelated to the justification for their entry into respondent's
apartment, it was ipso facto unreasonable. That lack ofrelationship always exists with regard to action validated under

85-1027-0PINION
4

ARIZONA v. HICKS

the "plain view" doctrine; where action is taken for the purpose justifying the entry, invocation of the doctrine is superfluous. Mincey v. Arizona, supra, in saying that a warrantless search must be "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies
which justify its initiation," 437 U. S., at 393 (citation omitted) was addressing only the scope of the primary search itself, and was not overruling by implication the many cases
acknowledging that the "plain view" doctrine can legitimate
action beyond that scope.
We turn, then, to application of the doctrine to the facts of
this case. "It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a
warrant," Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S., at 465
(plurality) (emphasis added). Those circumstances include
situations "[w]here the initial intrusion that brings the police
within plain view of such [evidence] is supported ... by one
of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement,"
ibid., such as the exigent-circumstances intrusion here. It
would be absurd to say that an object could lawfully be seized
and taken from the premises, but could not be moved for
closer examination. It is clear, therefore, that the search
here was valid if the "plain view" doctrine would have sustained a seizure of the equipment.
There is no doubt it would have done so if Officer Nelson
had probable cause to believe that the equipment was stolen.
The State has conceded, however, that he had only a "reasonable suspicion," by which it means something less than probable cause. See Brief for Petitioner 18-19. * We have not
ruled on the question whether probable cause is required in
order to invoke the "plain view" doctrine. Dicta in Payton
v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980) , suggested that the
standard of probable cause must be met, but our later opinions in Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 (1983), explicitly re*Contrary to the suggestion in JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissent, post, at
, this concession precludes our considering whether the probable-cause
standard was satisfied in this case.
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garded the issue as unresolved, see id., at 742, n. 7 (plurality); id., at 746 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).
We now hold that probable cause is required. To say otherwise would be to cut the "plain view" doctrine loose from
its theoretical and practical moorings. The theory of that
doctrine consists of extending to nonpublic places such as the
home, where searches and seizures without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable, the police's longstanding authority to make warrantless seizures in public places of such
objects as weapons and contraband. See Payton v. New
York, supra, at 586-587. And the practical justification for
that extension is the desirability of sparing police, whose
viewing of the object in the course of a lawful search is as legitimate as it would have been in a public place, the inconvenience and the risk-to themselves or to preservation of the
evidence-of going to obtain a warrant. See Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, supra, at 468 (plurality). Dispensing with
the need for a warrant is worlds apart from permitting a
lesser standard of cause for the seizure than a warrant would
require, i. e., the standard of probable cause. No reason is
apparent why an object should routinely be seizable on lesser
grounds, during an unrelated search and seizure, than would
have been needed to obtain a warrant for that same object if
it had been known to be on the premises.
We do not say, of course, that a seizure can never be justified on less than probable cause. We have held that it canwhere, for example, the seizure is minimally intrusive and
operational necessities render it the only practicable means of
detecting certain types of crime. See, e. g., United States v.
Cortez, 449 U. S. 411 (1981) (investigative detention of vehicle suspected to be transporting illegal aliens); United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975) (same); United
States v. Place , 462 U. S. 696, 709 and n. 9 (1983) (dictum)
(seizure of suspected drug dealer's luggage at airport to permit exposure to specially trained dog). No special operational necessities are relied on here, however-but rather the
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mere fact that the items in question carrie lawfully within the
officer's plain view. That alone cannot supplant the requirement of probable cause.
The same considerations preclude us from holding that,
even though probable cause would have been necessary for a
seizure, the search of objects in plain view that occurred here
could be sustained on lesser grounds. A dwelling-place
search, no less than a dwelling-place seizure, requires probable cause, and there is no reason in theory or practicality why
application of the plain-view doctrine would supplant tha.t requirement. Although the interest protected by the Fourth
Amendment injunction against unreasonable searches is
quite different from that protected by its injunction against
unreasonable seizures, see Texas v. Brown, supra, at
747-748 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment), neither the
one nor the other is of inferior worth or necessarily requires
only lesser protection. We have not elsewhere drawn a
categorical distinction between the two insofar as concerns
the degree of justification needed to establish the reasonableness of police action, and we see no reason for a distinction in
the particular circumstances before us here. Indeed, to
treat searches more liberally would especially erode the plurality's warning in Coolidge that "the 'plain view' doctrine
may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from
one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges." 403 U. S., at 466. In short, whether legal authority to move the equipment could be found only as an inevitable concomitant of the authority to seize it, or also as a consequence of some independent power to search certain
objects in plain view, probable cause to believe the equipment was stolen was required.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR's dissent suggests that we uphold the
action here on the ground that it was a "cursory inspection"
rather than a "full-blown search," and could therefore be justified by reasonable suspicion instead of probable cause. As
already noted, a truly cursory inspection-one that involves
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merely looking at what is already exposed to view, without
disturbing it-is not a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes, and therefore does not even require reasonable suspicion. We are unwilling to send police and judges into a new
thicket of Fourth Amendment law, to seek a creature of uncertain description that is neither a plain-view inspection nor
yet a "full-blown search." Nothing in the prior opinions of
this Court supports such a distinction, not even the dictum
from Justice Stewart's concurrence in Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U. S. 557, 571 (1969), whose reference to a "mere inspection" describes, in our view, close observation of what lies in
plain sight.
JUSTICE POWELL's dissent reasonably asks what it is we
would have had Officer Nelson do in these circumstances.
Post, at - - . The answer depends, of course, upon
whether he had probable cause to conduct a search, a question that was not preserved in this case. If he had, then he
should have done precisely what he did. If not, then he
should have followed up his suspicions, if possible, by means
other than a search-just as he would have had to do if, while
walking along the street, he had noticed the same suspicious
stereo equipment sitting inside a house a few feet away from
him, beneath an open window. It may well be that, in such
circumstances, no effective means short of a search exist.
But there is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to
protect the privacy of us all. Our disagreement with the dissenters pertains to where the proper balance should be
struck; we choose to adhere to the textual and traditional
standard of probable cause.
The State contends that, even if Officer Nelson's search violated the Fourth Amendment, the court below should have
admitted the evidence thus obtained under the "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule. That was not the question on which certiorari was granted, and we decline to consider it.
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. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Arizona is
Affirmed.
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